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'Monist Silence' of Television Criticized

AU2105073692 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
9 May 92 p 3

[Article by Guro Zeneli: "Why I Have Started Again To Listen to Voice of America and To Watch Foreign Television Stations"]

[Text] When the Workers Party [PPSh] was in power and Albania was under one-party rule, we all knew that the television was under the censorship of the party-state and only broadcast cheerful news, as if everything glittered in Albania and was always improving. Even the occasional critical news item that might appear was edited and checked several times. The party's scissors excised any criticism that was raised, lest it upset high circles. Any word that threatened the authority and rule of the dictatorship of the proletariat was erased.

However, with the establishment of pluralism in Albania and the victory of free speech and a free press, our television began to speak more openly. It could even be said that exaggeration became the television's main artistic resource. Strikes and assorted crimes took up about two-thirds of the news.

With the victory of the Democratic Party on 22 March this year, the situation "changed" at once, on 23 March. The "new day" began, as if life in Albania had begun on 22 March, as it did on 29 November 1944. We "inherited" from before the liberation nothing but the sea, while we have now "inherited" from the last 50 years nothing but the dark night of communism! This is the behavior of nihilistic and egotistical politicians, who ascribe all good things to their own rule, and all evil to the predecessors. (They say that the devil is not as black as he is painted, and that even the sun has its spots.)

But let us not leave the subject. The television now describes the political, economic, and social situation of the people as again tranquil, without specific daily problems. We see almost nothing of the problems and concerns of working people about resuming work, living conditions, and coping with difficulties. There is nothing about the acute problems of the countryside, where television cameras still do not penetrate, and when we all know the plight of Albanian villages. The 1 May program on the radio resembled the highly-polished broadcasts of Enver's days.

Let me mention another case. On 4 May, I saw on RAI-Uno [Italian Television's First Channel] a program in which the Italians showed the exhumation of Enver Hoxha and the other 11 former leaders. RAI-Uno showed their disinterment from the Martyrs' Cemetery and their reburial in the public cemetery of Sharre. However, what did our television provide? Only a curt announcement of 10-15 words that did not even tell us who had made the decision. Italy provided the information that the exhumation took place at night and that the reburial was before dawn, at 0600. Tirana Television did not say a word and showed no film.

The Voice of America also broadcast a short interview with Mr. P. Arbnori, while our radio and television maintained a monist silence.

Even other foreign stations provided lavish commentary. Again, Tirana Television maintained a monist silence.

Concerning the reburial of Myslim Peza in Peze, it was not mentioned at midday on 4 May that the government had dug a grave for him at Sharre, but that his bones were carried to Peze at the insistence of his relatives and an empty grave was left at Sharre. Nor did our television either mention or film the scene at Peze, where villagers, veterans, Father Myslim's comrades-in-arms, and a group of Socialist deputies had gathered. A strange business, a close friend of mine said with pain. This was once the style of the leftist PPSH, but is now the style cultivated by the rightist PPSH.

I would gently suggest that we should never revert for any news item to the euphoric and prettified style of the single-party system. People always want the truth. When the truth is concealed, it only spreads faster. Do not forget what our people say: The truth flies off and lands somewhere, and you cannot hide the sun with a sieve.

So, now that you have begun not to provide information or to be circumlocutory, not only I but others have again begun to listen to the Voice of America, as in 1990-91, when it gave us the necessary information, and to watch foreign television stations to find out what is happening in Albania today. What a shame, friends, gentlemen, and colleagues! Please do not commit this sin and do not create in us an aversion to our own television station, which should be Albania's favorite source of information.

Silence on Theft of Revolvers, Machineguns

AU1805080392 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
8 May 92 p 1

[Article by Fatbardh Kociue: "130 Revolvers and 35 Machineguns Stolen"]

[Text] A few days ago, an armament depot was looted in the area of Leskovik. The robbers managed to steal 130 revolvers and 35 machineguns. The event is shocking. The criminals and delinquents did not steal these arms to play with them, but to terrorize the people. And 165 armed delinquents is no small number. Nevertheless, everyone is now keeping silent about this dreadful event. The spokesmen of the Ministries of Defense and Public Order remain silent.

Until yesterday, we would see on television a delinquent attempting to rob an empty shop. That was a very good thing. The world and European press do not hesitate to publicize these events, as far as we can follow them. Is it just sensationalism? If we still think the same, that is a crazy mentality and practice. We should soon dissociate ourselves from it. Many shocking events, such as arms

looting, murders, etc., that have occurred after 22 March are hidden, especially by the television. The "river" of crimes that flowed across the television screen before the elections were intended to say: Look, the socialists are incapable of governing the state; they are unable to establish calm and public order.

Are there fewer crimes now, but perhaps more ugly and dreadful? If we had wanted to politicize the problem and the event in Erseke, we should have said: The new government members are unqualified and incapable of establishing order, though they promised to do so within 24 hours. No one but delinquents and law-breakers emerges victorious from this "sort" of party fighting. The socialists would never like to fall into such "traps" often instigated by the press and oral propaganda of those in power. They call on everybody to stand against crime and vandalism. The people and the country can win only in this way.

Whereas today, we keep silent and do not inform the public about such an event: Why? Out of neglect, to keep a secret, or not to create trouble for the directors of both ministries? Gentlemen who are in power! This working method belongs to the monism of the previous time. Dissociate yourselves from the past with deeds and become transparent as democracy wants you to be! The people want to be informed about events and to discover the authors of this crime. These are 165 firearms and not wooden arms.

Socialists Attend Reburial of Communist Veteran

AU2505070592 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 May 92 pp 1,3

[Article by Shpat Valmori: "Future Generations Will Call Him Father"]

[Text] Peze, the village of battles for freedom and independence, patriotic Peze of genuine democrats, Peze of the first organized band in the struggle against fascism, Peze that was burned three times by the invader and the country's traitors, legendary Peze of the Conference and of Father Myslim and other good and honest men will never forget the afternoon of 4 May 1992. It will never forget this day because as never before in its history and the history of all Albanians it witnessed an extraordinary ceremony: the reinterment of the bones of Father Myslim [Myslim Peza, 1897-1984, wartime leader and long-serving parliamentary deputy].

Pain saps the spirit, but no force can bring you to your knees when you are honest. The sorrow at the exhumation of Father Myslim and his wartime comrades therefore did affect honest people and touched them to the heart; the conscience of the people was this time nobler, kinder, and more civilized than that of certain politicians.

The people of Peze assembled in front of Father Myslim's house in order to do honor to him and themselves. A simple but moving ceremony was organized. The

majesty of this ceremony lay precisely in the nobility of the assembled people, in their silence, and in their generous souls that are able to forgive even such unheard-of adventures.

"I grew up with Father," said with pain Myrteza Karaj, an honored veteran and a brave former partisan of the Band of Peze. "I have never heard of the dead being exhumed from their graves before. Even when the Italian state sent its representatives to fetch its war dead, the exhumation was done with Albanian honesty and not like the work of thieves in the night. Father Myslim was indeed not killed in the war and was not declared a martyr, but he was the commander of many martyrs."

The 77-year-old Xha Myrtoja falls silent for a few moments, and continues:

"Father Myslim's family never let the guns fall from their hands when it was a matter of the people's freedom and independence. Father Myslim was like that himself. He fought against the Turks, against Zog and his lackeys, against the fascists, and against the Nazis. Yet the day comes when they say to him, 'You're not a martyr!...'"

These are affecting words. You hear people's distress in what they all say. Neither Muharrem Kodra, Bexhet Duraku, Gani Kola, nor Rexhep Ramazani is able to excuse the exhumation of the 12 men.

The coffin with the bones of Father Myslim lies in a room of the house in which the Conference of Peze was held on 16 September [1942]. It stands in the middle of the room covered with a red flag with its eagle and the Red star of the freedom fighters. Around it stand comrades-in-arms, fellow-villagers, members of the family, and veterans who have come from Tirana, Durrës, Diber, Kavaje, and Rrogozhinë. Comrade Fatos Nano, chairman of the Albanian Socialist Party (PSSH) Managing Committee; Comrade Gramoz Ruci, PSSh deputy chairman; Comrade Kastriot Islami, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly in the previous legislature; Comrade Dilaver Poci, deputy chairman of the National Committee of War Veterans and Invalids; deputies of the PSSh's parliamentary group; members of the PSSh Managing Committee; and Eurosocialist young people come to pay their respects to Father Myslim.

Haxhi Lleshi, Father Myslim's close friend, three-times commandant, and hero of the people, was also present. The generations were united, and brave men joined together to honor the legendary hero. By honoring Father Myslim, we honor an entire people, we honor the blood shed in the great war, and we honor Albania. It is therefore proper for us all to address Myslim Peza with that beloved word, father. That is what we always used to call him, and that is what we will call him in the future, down the generations.

Article Urges Production To Stem Inflation

AU2705090992 Tirana *ALTERNATIVA SD*
in *Albanian* 15 May 92 pp 2, 4

[Article by Pajtim Bello: "The Need To Staunche the Hemorrhage of the Lek"]

[Text] The population density per square meter is higher in a square in the center of Tirana with an area of less than one-tenth of a hectare than in any other place. The movements of customers, tensions and anxieties, supply and demand, the devaluation of the Albanian lek... these are all things that follow ever harder on each other each weary day on the battlefield of the free currency market. The expected has happened, and the exchange rate of the Albanian lek has fallen to 100 to the dollar. The devaluation of the Albanian lek continues, like a marathon without a finishing line, in which the value of the lek drops and we grow poorer ever day. However, neither the patch of land nor the clients who frequent it are to blame for this. What is happening here is the will of the laws of the market economy, in which the irrevocable laws of supply and demand operate in their purest fashion. They recognize no state decrees, shed no tears at the impoverishment of some, and do not rejoice at the profits of others. In the marathon devaluation of the lek, the eye of the economic analyst can gauge the state's economic power and discern an extreme form of economic collapse, in which the state long ago ceased to act and unfortunately still has not awakened from its lethargic sleep to exercise its protective functions. This process has been accompanied by catastrophic consequences for the people, the state, and the national economy. The hemorrhage of the lek plunges the people into ever deeper poverty. This impoverishment extends to all economic indicators and reaches into every cranny of Albanian life. Monthly salaries are now \$9-\$35. Real earnings have fallen significantly as a result of the drastic eight- to 15-fold price rises. The trend of this economic collapse is toward the destruction of the entire Albanian economy, and it seems that this hemorrhage will kill even those who now rejoice at it.

Of course, social and economic reality must and can halt this snowballing avalanche. This can be achieved if the state and its specialist bodies intervene in economic ways to influence the factors that first caused and are now perpetuating and accelerating the hemorrhage of the falling lek. The exchange rate of the lek is among other things dictated by the rate of inflation in the Albanian economy, the state of equilibrium between the supply of and demand for foreign currency, and the power and scope for activity of speculators. Today's social and economic situation and the continuing absence of an effective response by the law-governed state and its specialist bodies to the consequences left behind by Albania's phantasmagoric economic career still encourage the malignant tumors of the aforementioned factors.

The graph of inflation is heading toward a high peak, and every day scales new and unprecedented heights. The government has declared a war on inflation, but there can be no war or victory without firing the engines of the economy. A dead engine merely means subjection to and defeat at the hands of the monster of inflation. It is therefore vital to start producing goods. This is not only one of the pillars of the existence and progress of society, but lack of production is also a basic factor in encouraging and maintaining high inflation. The Albanian lek sits like a lead weight on one side of the economic scales of money versus goods, and continues to tilt the balance to the floor. Only domestically produced goods placed on the other sides of these very delicate economic scales will rescue the economy from inflation, the Albanian lek from devaluation, and the currency's poor users from the anxiety and insecurity that has now seized them. We ask the government to spare no means in stimulating the production of goods as soon as possible. There is not the slightest doubt that such an initiative would greatly facilitate the conduct of the economic reform. It is not as impossible to start producing goods as it seems or as some specialists, journalists, politicians, and officials assert. Private or state agricultural and stock-raising farms have virtually every condition for production. From today on, no land should lie fallow. State bodies, banks, and other institutions must exercise their vital economic authority, forging a saving alliance with this important sector of the economy. One could say the same of other important sectors of industry, services, or transportation, which are state-owned and state-funded, but where earnings are openly expropriated. It is difficult if not impossible to carry out the economic reform if the economy remains paralyzed.

The growth of the money supply, which is not covered by the necessary increased volume of goods on the domestic market, has been and remains the second factor that continually stimulates inflation and simultaneously leads to the devaluation of the Albanian lek against foreign currency. The uncontrolled growth of the money supply has turned inflation into a mythological monster whose tentacles squeeze and destroy sections of Albanian society. The growth of the money supply must therefore be restrained. This will be an effective measure only if it is rigorously enforced through economic channels and mechanisms. In mechanical terms, it means defusing the devastating bomb that the governments of 1989, 1990, and 1991 left as a souvenir to Meksi's government. Reducing the quantity of money put into circulation implies freezing wages and blocking transactions and services that require cash payments and pave the way for acute socioeconomic problems. This will create a difficult situation that the impoverished masses of the people will find hard to support. We cannot therefore start by freezing wages (I say we should not start this way, because that is where we will end up if we do not act fast), but should apply other measures that will not worsen but alleviate the people's plight. The new law on the banks and the banking system, which creates the opportunity of forming a monetary policy, also

permits the introduction of administrative measures that yield fast results. Under such circumstances, we would suggest that banking practice should be to grant credit only for the purposes of production, in other words to encourage the purchase of the raw materials, machinery, and equipment that are required for production processes.

The granting of credit for mercantile purposes, and still worse for currency exchange, must be prevented by law for a certain period until the production of goods has revived and the economic reform has taken root. There must also be restrictions on the granting of credit for building or reconstruction, a measure that should remain in force until the priority of production above all other activities is established. The bank and all other relevant institutions must necessarily ensure that payments between economic partners are not made in cash as is the case today. This is a peculiarity of ours that is entirely avoidable. This must be done without hesitation, because, besides reducing the demand for an increase in the money supply, it would eliminate the available scope for corruption. Monetary policy should create opportunities for state or private enterprises that produce goods for the domestic market to also enter the free foreign currency market. This will enable them to obtain foreign currency in order to import raw materials without waiting for the state to provide it and without purchasing it from third parties, whether private traders or commission dealers. Such a monetary measure would greatly encourage the production of goods and would combat inflation in the economy.

With the present severe shortage of domestically produced goods, traders and consumers turn their eyes to the foreign market that accepts payment only in hard currency. This leads to a daily increasing demand for foreign currency. Albanian exports are a negligible source of foreign currency earnings; as a result, foreign currency is supplied solely by the earnings of illegal emigrants. The very high demand for foreign currency has led to the decline in value of the Albanian lek.

Production for export must be given priority as soon as possible. This will improve the foreign balance of payments and will add to our sources of foreign currency, thus helping its supply. The export of currently stockpiled goods, including even some food items such as olives, which have been misused, must also be encouraged. The noose of licenses and bureaucracy whose tight strictures do the economy so much harm must also be loosened. In taking these measures, government bodies should hurry to descend to the actual factory floor of the economy.

It would perhaps be useful for the banks to engage in the purchase and sale of foreign currency, because, as we said, emigres bring this currency. It is precisely this currency that keeps the Albanian market afloat. If the bank were to absorb this currency at its real rate of exchange on the free market, it would not only become a source of foreign currency credit for the production of

goods and subsequently for investment, but would be able to eliminate the speculation on the devaluation of the Albanian lek that currently influences currency exchange dealings.

Trade Union Paper on Management Corruption

AU1505101892 Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian
6 May 92 p 2

[Article by Vilson Qendro: "Transition and Corruption"]

[Text] The massive phenomenon of speculation by former wielders of power has now become a tumor on the body of our modest wealth. It was made possible by the stagnation of the transition period, a stagnation that these people themselves created and encouraged with malevolent and criminal intentions. They were greatly helped in this by their Red clan and the single-party parliament and government. The revelation of abuses, or rather thefts, no longer surprises anybody. However base these acts may be, they are so common that they no longer make a real impression or disturb the authorities that should prevent, investigate, and judge such cases, such as the procurator, the investigator, and the Fraud Squad. If these do not act, who will stay the hand of these new capitalists, who are mostly either Red or have recently given up this hue and tried to become blue.

The strangest things have happened in the transition period in Albania, phenomena that did not take root in the countries of our fellow-sufferers in the East, or at least not to the same extent. This is not any fault of the Albanian people, who heroically endured the heavy burden of communism (if that is what we can call the system under which we lived). During this period, the communist leaders worked and prepared the ground, assisted in this by this people's extreme poverty. They succeeded in concealing the abuses and thefts they had committed by inciting mob raids on the storehouses of retail enterprises and on humanitarian aid.

A great deal has been written in the press about the situation discovered in the storehouses during the attacks of throngs of people. These warehouses stored goods that had been hoarded for years at a time when the market was absolutely empty. These leeches, after having taken what they wanted, incited the masses to seize what remained. Dozens of people lost their lives during these onslaughts, but what did that matter to them? Our people got to know about these incidents from the press and television. Can the devastation at Lac, Fushe Arrez, Pogradec, Lunder, Lushnje, etc. be forgotten? It seems that the communists had decided to hand over a devastated Albania to a future democratic regime, without productive enterprises, and, worse, without hospitals or schools.

The fever of greed took root in a small section of the population, in the section that still had an opportunity to grow rich. This infectious disease then spread to the masses of the people. Which of the leaders of the

single-party era did not plot how to grow rich? Which of them failed to attempt, even by illegal means, to gain a little extra for himself? Appetite comes with eating.

State control was not only absent, but its operation encouraged matters further. Some Laborite leaders, in order to keep their noses clean, threw away their party cards and immediately joined the opposition parties. This step was the most dangerous kind of behavior, because it not only secured their immunity but infected the parties that gave them shelter and lowered their credibility in the public eye.

The Independent Trade Unions, both centrally and at the grass roots, have exposed many cases of abuse by enterprise managers, who, on the basis of the Laborite laws on privatization, bought for a song various installations of their enterprises for private use or in order to start private businesses.

Apart from certain special cases of the arrival of a legacy from abroad, managers were in most cases state employees with a fixed salary that was not far from that of a worker. In no way could they turn themselves into proprietors by buying premises or entire departments. Many of them, using business trips abroad and disregarding the purpose of these trips, forged connections for their own private interests and are now putting themselves forward as co-owners, purchasing one factory or another. Communist business executives now sell automobiles on the main squares of towns. Taking advantage of the stagnation created by the Laborites themselves, they also deceive workers by collecting signatures for the co-ownership of production. In fact, this production comes to belong to the managers, who also therefore pay themselves. Such cases have been found in various bread bakeries, retail premises, clothing production divisions, etc. The foreign trade enterprises should also be mentioned here. The managers, taking advantage of their key positions both in the ministry and the enterprises, are profiting by abusing both the goods and the sweat and efforts of the work force.

Nobody knows the exact selling prices of medicinal herbs, canned goods, etc. Looking at the movements of prices in the documents immediately implants suspicions of embezzlement, because the prices for our goods are always lower than those on the world market. The transition period, with our economy in a state of coma, gave our economic enterprises the opportunity to forge ties abroad. Of course, Laborite managers would be and were appointed to lead these delegations. Crusades set off for the West. Neighboring Italy and to a lesser extent Germany and France became playgrounds for these managers' abuses.

It must be emphasized that all these journeys were financed by the funds of the enterprises themselves, funds that were not able to keep the work force in bread. Now, after one year of gallivanting, it is clear that not a single contract has been signed with Western firms, and the fault lies at our door. How could such agreements be

reached when the entire Laborite clan throughout the entire transition period worked for the very opposite goal, and encouraged the country's destabilization? Which firm would have risked its money in the mayhem of Albania?

At first sight, these trips did not help either the enterprises or their tourist managers. The truth is however quite different. These journeys, as we now see, were used to create personal ties with foreign firms, which, to judge by their activities so far, are far from serious. One can unhesitatingly call them groups of speculators who, profiting from the wretched state of our people, come to fleece them even further. There is no other way to explain the fact that they only offer \$1 per day. Would a foreign worker accept this wage? Of course not. These, then, are the investors who have come to Albania so far. This is only to be expected because an Albanian speculator would no doubt attach himself to a kindred spirit elsewhere.

Foreign investors will of course be necessary to revive the Albanian economy and to employ our people in the present plight to which we have been reduced. However, we hope that they will be honest, industrious, and serious people.

In the new period on which we are embarking, thanks to the will of the masses of the people, we demand not only an end to the paralysis of the 80-percent wage rate [wages paid to laid-off workers] and a start to production that will directly lead to lower prices for food and consumer goods, but, what is more important, we want to show Europe and the world that this people is ready to work, does not want to live on charity, and wishes to earn its own daily bread. The Albanian people want to show that it was not they themselves but the communist system and the caste running it that reduced Albania to this plight.

At all its meetings with the president and the new government, the Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions has demanded the renewal of the entire administrative structure, because central power has no meaning without local power. Let us remember what befell Noli's government in 1924.

No economic reform could have been carried out or could have had any effect with the old administration in power. The renewal of the administration would help, especially psychologically, to restore confidence among the people. There can be no reform with communists or pseudodemocrats at the top.

The other demand of the Independent Trade Unions, for a review and inspection of the sources of the wealth of leading cadres in the transition period, is more than justifiable at the present moment. If communists were to join the ranks of new managers, the struggle to establish democracy would lose all its meaning.

Trade Unionists Assaulted After Strike Threat*AU2005175592 Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian
2 May 92 p 1*

[Report by SINDIKALISTI correspondent: "Strike Starts in Shkoder Today"]

[Text] The start and progress of work at the Adelchi-Albania joint enterprise in Shkoder has been watched by the entire public in our country as an example of the hope that cooperation with foreigners may offer. It can be said that this hope has so far been to some extent justified. The pace of work has accelerated fast, and the workers at this Shkoder shoe factory have been the first to receive more acceptable wages. Meanwhile, the "Albanian side" that represented the enterprise began to show a talent for "business" alongside Sergio Adelchi, and reduced the share of Albanian capital to 7 percent. However, other more serious problems for the work force were to arise later. From the start, the Adelchi firm paid \$5.60 per day for each Albanian worker; this was converted at the then exchange rate of 15 leks to the dollar and meant a real wage for the employees. However, as we know, the dollar rate is now three and a half times higher and is 50 leks to the dollar. The wages of workers at the factory have failed to take this into account and have remained fixed at 128 leks per day. This means that for them a dollar is valued at only 21 leks.

As the workers say, this is outright cheating, even though the Italian side continues to pay \$5.60 per day. Under such circumstances, it is the right of the workers to use every means to demand what belongs to them. However, their demands found no support, and they decided to go on strike on 2 May. They merely scoffed at the pressure of the young Albanian "businessmen," who claimed that all the Shkoder workers would be thrown on the street and that their work would be sent for completion to the Adelchi plant in Tirana, because strikebreakers will never be found among the democratic workers of Tirana.

It must nevertheless be said that "strange" things are meanwhile happening in Shkoder. Eduart Manari, trade union chairman at the new shoe factory, was struck with an ax in the street one night as he was returning from the factory together with his fiancée. He was soaked with blood, and left with the threat that he would be killed outright if he talked again about the interests of the workers. The same thing happened to Ali Sucaj, another trade unionist at the factory. He was beaten up and threatened with worse if he did not "turn back from the road he had set out on."

With the aim of destroying the trade union at the factory and getting rid of its members, girls and women at this factory are being threatened and humiliated by the foul language of the "guards" of certain persons who lay down the law in the factory in the name of "the Albanian side."

On the basis of eye-witness accounts available to us, it is perfectly clear who these people are, but we have decided for the moment to follow the progress of this strike while "pretending" that we do not know who is organizing these wretched "unknown persons" who chase our trade unionists at night with axes.

However, we will not wait long. In our new feature, "Octopus," in our next issue, dear readers, we will acquaint you with the "king" of the carrot and the stick who has begun to terrorize the democratic city of Shkoder, opening new wounds that are as painful as the old ones that have not yet healed.

Thefts Impede Revival of Enterprises*AU1505132792 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian
7 May 92 p 1*

[Article by Tomor Jolldashi: "'We're Being Robbed...' the Director Says"]

[Text] More urgently than ever, "Back to work" is the motto of the day.

A return to work now equals democracy. However, how can we bring people back to work when they have no work to do, when there are no raw materials, when there are no tools or machinery, and people's sources of enthusiasm for work are exhausted? Let the new government provide the answer, we hope as soon as possible. Our hopes lie in it. Nevertheless, there are people who work in one or two factories and agricultural enterprises where there is no shortage of raw materials, transport for workers, and goodwill. The Elbasan Brick Factory and some departments of the steel combine are in production. Work is being done, production is under way, and workers are paid well in the Wood Combine, the agricultural enterprises, and....

"This pay would be higher," some enterprise directors told us, "if our production were not stolen." "Yes, yes, there is theft in broad daylight," some directors conclude, thus expressing a major and evident concern. Nevertheless, only expectation and despair at a solution to this problem follow this remark.

"Why should we work and wear ourselves out," a worker in the greenhouses near the steel combine told us, "when they come with sacks and steal our cucumbers?"

"Fourteen armed men came to our greenhouse yesterday," explains Ymer Jaho, greenhouse supervisor at the agricultural enterprise, "and they threatened us with being shot if we made objections. They entered the greenhouses, filled the sacks with cucumbers, and left in peace. Of course, we notified the police, who arrived, gave us advice, and departed, not forgetting to remind us, 'If the bandits come again, call us in time.'"

"And did they come?"

"These bandits come whenever they want. They steal as many cucumbers as they want and wander off undisturbed," Ymer explains. "They say they sell the cucumbers in Tirana and Korce. They sell our sweat."

"Do you know what the workers tell me?" Brigade-Leader Emine Allkja says. "We work hard all the year and now the results (i.e. the profit) slips from our fingers just like that. Why should we still turn up to work? The will to work has since declined not only in our greenhouses but in the tomato section, where production is expected to be ready soon. They too are frightened of their crop being stolen."

As we talked, my mind wandered to the Pluralist District Executive Committee, whose door is guarded every day by up to four armed policemen. Why are these policemen necessary in the mornings, when the building is crowded with the clerks of the various sections? Whom are they guarding? Would it not be better for these policemen to guard the greenhouses from thieves? A host of questions come to mind, and there is no way that I can imagine that the police are incapable of nabbing the greenhouse thieves. What are the enterprises and their directors and management doing themselves, or do they consider their duty done when they report the crime and sit and wait?

As Ymer Jaho and the agronomist Fadil Tafa tell me themselves, four people are paid as armed guards for the cucumber greenhouses for each shift, i.e. 12 men in all at a rate of 100 leks each per day. The continuing thefts show that these guards are paid in vain, and paid well, too, at triple the daily rate of a greenhouse worker. If we add the fact that the production costs of 1 kg of cucumbers are four or five times higher this year than last year, preserving produce from misuse, let alone theft, assumes a primary importance, because this is where rising production costs start.

Theft has another, disguised appearance at the Elbasan Industrial Retail Enterprise. One fine morning, the goods in the warehouse are discounted by a "commission" whose members, consisting of a section of the management and the director Bashkim Cerma, who is now well known for profitable manipulation and intrigue for himself and his clan, buy the goods "for a song" in order to subsequently resell them privately at high prices. Brazen theft still takes place in broad daylight in the cement factory and the brickyard. Gentlemen of the management, step out into the free (or rather black) market one day and you will see how the goods stolen from your enterprises are sold.

"We have caught many of these wheeler-dealers who sell stolen goods," said Eduard Kila, district Fraud Squad chief. "We have taken inventories of the confiscated goods, but our personnel have been subjected to many threats. Can one work in this way?"

Yet we ask for people to return to work. This is an imperative of the times. However, just as we need raw materials to set our factories in motion, we equally need to protect production from theft and to provide safety

for people so that they may work in peace in these tense times. Otherwise, people's flickering or newly kindled desire to start work will be quenched again, because the sweat people shed in indissolubly involved with the gain they expect. If the expected gain is small, the desire to work will be similarly small. This is beyond dispute.

Article Calls for Radical Army Reform

AU2705085392 Tirana ALTERNATIVA SD
in Albanian 28 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Major Ridvan Zotka: "The Reform in the Army Cannot Be Carried Out by Those Who Do Not Want It"]

[Text] The structural reform should first start from the ministry. The ministry should not have excessive staff, as in the time of Murra and Mustaqi [former communist defense minister and Army chief of staff], but should assume a new form. It will become more maneuverable and effective if it is divided into military and auxiliary departments consisting of six or seven directorates and two or three sectors altogether. The two main pillars of the General Army Staff should be the Directorates of Operations and Military Training, which should be made up of specialists in tanks, engineering, chemistry, communication, and topography, thus avoiding the need for special directorates. Alongside these two very important directorates, we should list the Artillery Directorate, including armaments and ammunition, the Directorate of Investigation and Information, and the commands of the Military Fleet and the Air Force.

I think that the Assistance Department should consist of the Support Supply Directorate and Military and Vehicle Industry Directorate, the Staff and Organization Department, and the Education and Culture Department.

I do not know what troubles the gentlemen of the Tank Directorate are causing for themselves, when it is quite evident that the tank units are under the command of the operational units.

If the ministry's staff is going to plan this structure itself, they will behave in the same way they did with the promotion criteria and the salary scales, taking the lion's share for themselves.

It would have been more fruitful if a working group made up of capable and conscientious officers from the Academy of the General Army Staff and military units, former prisoners of conscience, and some member of the Retired Military Servicemen's Association had planned this structure under the direction of the defense minister. The general commander in chief would then have to approve the structure.

If this is left to the ministry's staff, we will go round and round in a vicious circle and will end up where we started, as if by tradition. The appointment of the new defense minister is positive, despite the rumors spread about him for political reasons. He should not be left

completely alone to face the pressure of the apparatchiks. I have seen the fierce fighting and pressures that the bureaucrats of the staff exerted to rescue even one of their former positions. The operational units should have a trim, high-quality staff including represents of every arm of the services, arranged in four or five branches. They can thus more effectively understand aid and responsibility for the situation.

The most important matter requiring care and responsibility is the selection of military officials. Such examples as the mechanical transformation of commissars into education chiefs make a mockery of depoliticization. The transfers from the Defense Ministry to the staffs of Tirana divisions or the sectors of other ministries were attempts to find a place on the payroll for friends.

It is paradoxical that the Education Department in the Defense Ministry is led by instructors from the Labor Party committee, and education in general is conducted by former secretaries of the Labor Party committees. They should understand that they should retire from military life, if they are not efficient in other military sectors. This problem, which has so often been treated by the press, has been abandoned and no one wants to solve it.

As regards appointments of military staff, tests should be introduced for every job. These tests should have primary requirements, such as education, school results, work assessments, age, research, and management and organization abilities in the previous post. We should also not neglect personal qualities such as devotion to work, honesty, and propriety, which are very necessary for the military serviceman. Regarding these qualities, a special emphasis should be placed on the general cultural background of the military servicemen. It happened that in the staff of one military unit, an officer of 25 years' standing and inhabitant of Tirana did not know when Tirana was declared the country's capital. Another officer from the military staff of Lac does not know where Albulene is.

We should employ all those who want to work, in order not to keep the military cadres on the alert waiting to see what will happen. We should provide the necessary legal provision for social security, in order not to cause significant social consequences for those who will leave regular service and be relegated to the reserves.

The rumor that certain age groups will be relegated to the reserves has no real basis and is not democratic. The older age groups include incapable Enverists, who vegetate with the evils the system cultivated in them, but also those who have dedicated themselves to work and who keep up with the times. In younger age groups, there are clever and energetic young men, but there are also others who, though trained to lead a brigade at school, are incapable of commanding even a company or a platoon or disciplining themselves and who hold little promise of becoming a military serviceman.

There are some Army cadres in poor health who cannot withstand the burden that the future will pose. It would be kind to relegate these people to the reserves and give them a special financial benefit, especially those who have served in the Army for more than 20 years.

I am surprised to see how several cadres introduced by Enver Hoxha in 1975 to save the party pyramid in the Army still eat the Army's bread. These carpenters and drivers with freely awarded diplomas from the Higher Party School and the Military Academy, together with the team of Prokop Murra, Kico Mustaqi, Simon Stefani, and Xhelil Gjoni influenced the indoctrination of the Army. They were bulwarks against the democratic processes and with their line of masses theory, they are the main culprits for slackness in the Army, the decline in discipline, and the evils of their own party cultivated among military servicemen.

I think we should relegate to the reserves those who, after performing military service, worked in the economy for three to five years and were given the title of officer through back scratching and toadyism. Today, they are almost at the level of privates. They were then recruited for the "urgent needs" of filling up the free military schools. Now they must leave their places to capable people.

Until 1968, the Joint Military School accepted students with seven years' schooling. The majority of them graduated from night school or high school by correspondence after receiving the title of officer. Some of these preparatory cadres, as they were called, graduated from the High Military Academy, even without completing high school. You can do nothing with these socialist paradoxes. Those without high school education should be relegated to the reserves. As regards the others, each of them should be individually examined.

Those who have graduated from the Higher Party School should pass through the sieve of a test. After assessing their military abilities, they should go to the position they had before dealing with party work.

I am of the opinion that all the appointments made by the Labor Party Central Committee from brigade commander and upwards should be reviewed to see whether these people can still stay in these places or not. It is well known that the first criteria of their appointment was their loyalty to the Labor Party. It is also evident that if you were an inhabitant of Lunxheri or even married someone there, Mihal Bisha, not to think of those above him in rank, could give you an appointment.

The legal education should take place alongside structural reform. This requires the presence of the juridical institutions within the joint military units, independent of the command. This fully protects the legitimate rights of military servicemen. There is no need for requests to create associations, such as that of the active military servicemen, whose initiator was unfortunately one of the most zealous activists of the "Volunteers of Enver" in

1991. Because great tasks await the Army, I believe that everyone should find his own position.

Justice Ministry Official on Foreign Adoption

AU2105112992 Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian
6 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Zylfi Beqja, director of the Directorate for Organization of Legal Control in the Justice Ministry, by Anton Joro; place and date not given: "A Defective Law, an Implicated Presidential Cabinet, and Children From Shkoder Who Are Adopted in Tirana"]

[Text] [Joro] What is your opinion concerning the problem of the adoption of Albanian children by foreign nationals?

[Beqja] Our directorate especially deals with the functioning of courts and the way legal regulations are applied. Upon receiving letters, complaints, or requests from the citizens, we verify the adjudicated cases to see whether they have been fairly settled.

We have followed the case on the adoption of Albanian children by foreign nationals, and we have had many reservations regarding the fact that our law on the adoption of children by foreign nationals is defective and only verbal. We have tried to revoke these cases, but the Supreme Court President Kleanthi Koci has intervened, saying that this is not under our authority, something that is unfortunately true.

The adoption of Albanian children by foreign nationals later found support from the former Justice Minister Shefqet Muci.

[Joro] It is said and even the foreign press has written about the trade in Albanian children. What do you think of this?

[Beqja] There is talk about a trade in children, but there are no facts to prove this, as far as I know. I think that this case should have passed to the Investigators' Office long ago.

[Joro] Have you noticed any procedural defects in these cases?

[Beqja] I want to take a chronological view. We have had no problems of this kind before, because the one-party state did not allow this phenomenon, although the law existed, with its defects.

Alongside the democratic changes that occurred in our country, the courts agreed to adoptions following the increasing requests from foreigners. Meanwhile, the foreigners became aware that adoptions were being allowed in Albania. The law on this problem has many defects, thus opening the possibility for mistakes.

Following the procedure, the courts should have first been acquainted with the legislation of the foster parents' countries, something that they have not done. In this case, they have applied the Family Code alone. There is something else: They have followed a procedure not included in the law. Before being sent to the relevant court, the foster parents' documents were passed to the president's cabinet. This has no legal basis. It was said that the president should give his consent. I think that the president has not stated his view, but the courts have received the documents for or against an adoption signed by officials of the presidential cabinet.

The second point, which I think constitutes a procedural inexactitude, is that adoptions throughout the country are concentrated in the court of Tirana. This is not normal. If the child is in Shkoder, why should his adoption be decided in Tirana? The Supreme Court should explain this practice followed so far.

[Joro] How many Albanian children have been adopted by foreign nationals?

[Beqja] For the period between 1991 and 13 March of 1992, a total of 260 Albanian children were adopted. Of this group, 140 were adopted by Italian citizens. The others were adopted by Greek, French, American, and some Belgian nationals.

[Joro] Your directorate is preparing a study on this problem. In your opinion, what is the weakest link in the chain of procedures to adopt an Albanian child?

[Beqja] I cannot give details, because the study has not been finished. A general feature of adoptions here has been the consent by orphanage directors to the adoption of illegitimate children.

Controversy Over Media Law Proposal Escalates*92CH0580A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 2 May 92 pp 76-77*

[Article by Ibolya Jakus: "Draft Media Law—The Smuggling of Paragraphs"]

[Text] Compromises, rather than mature consensual agreements, were reached regarding a number of key issues, signaling the acquiescence of the various negotiating sides. On balance, this is the summary result of more than a year's work on the media law that was placed on the National Assembly's urgent agenda last Monday. The fact that Justice Ministry officials "sneaked in" a few changes that substantially differ from the provisions agreed upon by the six parties is of far greater concern, however; these changes could prompt the opposition to vote against debating the proposal on the floor.

After months of skirmishing about the television and the radio itself, it was somewhat surprising that in the final round of drafting waves of passions mounted highest not about issues related to the public media, but concerning frequency allocation and the Radio-Television Office [RTH]—the future, new institution slated to make decisions concerning the licensing of new electronic media. True, viewpoints were light-years apart also in this regard. The ruling parties originally perceived the RTH as part of the state administrative hierarchy with its chairman appointed by the prime minister, of course. In contrast, the opposition started out by claiming that the independence of the RTH could best be guaranteed by conditioning the chairman's appointment by confirmation resulting from the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of parliament. The combination of these two viewpoints produced a solution regarded as one of the most important political compromises reached in the course of preparatory work: Although the chairman of the RTH would be chosen and appointed by the prime minister, such choice could only be made from among competing candidates selected by, and enjoying the support of, a two-thirds majority of the RTH Social Council (RTH TT)—a balanced body from the standpoint of partisan interests. Based on this perception a similar agreement would also be required to relieve the chairman from his duties.

But the order of appointment and dismissal has undergone major surgery in the present version of the proposed media law, as submitted by the government, much to the shock of persons responsible for media affairs in the opposition parties. The appointment provision has been amended by granting veto power to the prime minister, i.e., by stating that "a new competition must be announced if the prime minister does not wish to appoint any of the candidates offered." The compromise passage concerning the relief of the chairman from his duties has simply been maimed by the government; based on the new provision the prime minister could dismiss the chairman while "aware" of the RTH TT's

view, but without its concurrence. In other words, the prime minister could exercise his veto power until the TT nominated a candidate of his liking, and, from a practical standpoint, he would have a free hand in relieving the chairman from his duties, according to SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] representative Miklos Haraszti in response to a HETI VILAGGAZDASAG question. In Haraszti's view, this change actually smuggled back the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] original proposal into the text. FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] Representative Peter Molnar sees it this way: This solution foreshadows a repetition of what has taken place regarding the appointment of court chairmen, and this fact alone raises questions as to whether the proposal is acceptable to the opposition.

All this is viewed differently by MDF Representative Ferenc Kulin, chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Culture. In response to our question he asserted foremost of all that it was natural for the government to submit its own, sovereign legislative proposal, one that did not necessarily agree verbatim with the proposal developed by the Subcommittee on the Press. To the contrary, in this instance the detailed preparatory work performed by the subcommittee should be regarded as unusual, he added. And insofar as the substance of this issue is concerned, the two-thirds majority requirement to confirm the chairman had to be offset by veto power and authority to recall, because short of such provisions a situation could arise in which the RTH was unable to function, according to Kulin. A situation like this must not be permitted to arise in an institution whose clients are expected to be primarily foreigners, according to the committee chairman. In Kulin's view, paragraphs that provide an itemized list of conditions for competing for and operating commercial television stations prevent political interference under the law, and these requirements can also be enforced through the courts, according to Kulin.

Despite this explanation, one need not be overly suspicious to recognize that the examples of Elemer Hankiss and Csaba Gombar loom behind the odd appointment and dismissal procedures; these examples served as "warnings" to the government that even if it was possible to reach a consensus for the appointment of a nominee, it would be difficult to obtain a two-thirds majority to support the possible dismissal of an incumbent chairman from a body that consisted of three ruling-party representatives and three opposition representatives, in addition to representatives of the profession. This, of course, provides a good reason from the standpoint of the ruling parties to find a different solution, but the opposition believes that going into the other extreme and increasing the potential of the government to influence the affairs of this, politically rather sensitive, institution is not the best method.

Contrary to what they thought of the chapter dealing with newly established media, interested persons regarded part of the proposal that dealt with the Hungarian Television (MTV) and the Hungarian Radio

(MR) as a "good foundation" for debate. This, of course, should not be understood to mean that there were no differences in opinion regarding several attending issues. For example, the ruling parties insisted so strongly on installing the presidents of the MR and the MTV based on the infamous "appointments law" only to make the opposition surrender in the end. Both sides act on the basis of different considerations, of course. The ruling parties might have pinned their hopes to the fact that the Constitutional Court has substantially curtailed the appointment power of the president of the Republic and has rendered that power a mere formality, and that consequently the real decision would be made by the prime minister. On the other hand, the opposition might have pinned its hopes to Arpad Goncz saying "no" in the end, if that became necessary. At the same time, however, Miklos Haraszti regards as highly contradictory the fact that although the boards of trustees of the MR Public Foundation and the MTV Public Foundation—formed to establish the MR and the MTV respectively—would be the employers of public media presidents, these bodies have no say in the appointment of presidents. (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 18 April 1991). In Haraszti's view, a situation in which the boards of trustees of these public foundations, rather than parliament's Committee on Culture, as designated by the appointments law, would approve the prime minister's nominee—with a two-thirds majority, if possible—would be a rational compromise. This would represent a greater guarantee for the independence of the MR and MTV presidents in Haraszti's view, because, as compared to the relative strength of the various parties seated in parliament reflected in the composition of the Committee on Culture, both the ruling parties and the opposition could delegate three representatives to these boards of trustees, and the remaining five, preferably nonpartisan, professional members would be elected by these six persons. The SZDSZ representative also complained about the lack of a requirement for the MR and MTV presidents to concur with the choice of two vice presidents mandated by the appointments law. Peter Molnar of FIDESZ—who has advocated from the outset that the MR and MTV presidents be elected by a two-thirds majority of National Assembly representatives—has also been dissatisfied because as a result of the overly politicized character of the board, the threat of multiparty supervision over the public media arises. On top, the boards of trustees would not be supervising business corporations established by the public foundations—a function the rejected alternative has called for—but instead, institutions funded by the state budget which have limited economic freedom and limited opportunity to obtain funds anyway.

Some other problems in the proposal, not primarily of a political character, have also emerged recently: Only here and there is it possible to find deadlines in the proposal. Although the question of deadlines seems to be insignificant, it is by far not inconsequential: Haraszti demonstrated that if the adoption of the law, the transformation of the present institutional system of the

media, and the establishment of the new organizations were to take place within the optimum time period, and further, if the missing deadlines alongside the various mandates contained in the law were substituted with the 30-day deadline customary in today's state administrative practice, the licensing procedure of a new commercial channel would consume three years at best; i.e., a proceeding started today could only be completed a year after the next elections. Not to mention the fact that having a license does not necessarily mean that broadcasting operations can begin.

Despite the fact that parliament has agreed to place the legislative proposal on the urgent agenda last Monday, the first item on the schedule—the 1 July effective date of the law—is already threatened. If all goes well, general debate will begin toward the end of May, and the little more than a month available to the National Assembly before it begins its summer recess in late June is hardly enough to complete the process. The moreso because the plenary debate of the proposal emerging from under the "protective cover" of the Subcommittee on the Press—which also enlisted quite a few amateur television and radio experts—is hardly going to be limited to the few issues described above, which have aggrieved those who have done the preparatory work thus far.

Charges Against TV President Hankiss Detailed

92CH0558A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 7 Apr 92 p 13

[Article by Geza Lanyi: "Is Hankiss Suitable?"]

[Text] I am reading in the 30 and 31 March 1992 issues of UJ MAGYARORSZAG the amply documented article by L.P. entitled "Media File," but it could have been called "Hankiss File" just as well. The pages of the file intend to answer the question whether Hankiss is suitable for office. That, incidentally, is the question that Prime Minister Jozsef Antall has referred to the National Assembly's Cultural Committee.

Regarding the aspects and stages of the investigation into his suitability (or unsuitability), Ferenc Kulin, the chairman of the Cultural Committee, made the following statement to PESTI HIRLAP's reporter:

"The National Assembly's Constitutional Committee will have the first say. It must decide whether Elemer Hankiss, upon his sudden return home, acted lawfully or arbitrarily against [his vice president,] Gabor Nahlik. Once we receive the Constitutional Committee's report, we will hear the testimony of Hungarian Television's [MTV's] senior officials. We will be interested to hear their assessment of Elemer Hankiss's performance to date. For we have to know what relations between him and his colleagues are like, how he has been safeguarding MTV's organization, participating in the shaping of programming policy and overseeing its practical application."

Elemer Hankiss was appointed president of MTV effective 1 August 1990. Upon introducing himself to his senior colleagues at MTV, he emphasized that he intended to create an independent, modern TV network that would meet European standards. He claimed to have no preconceptions; everything would be solved jointly with MTV's best experts. On 15 August he issued a circular containing 10 questions, from which anyone but the blind could see that there must have been preconceptions after all, because the questions had been worded to prompt strongly biased answers. At that time he was still urging MTV's best experts—they blissfully were not yet suspecting anything—to "produce" kilograms of professional reports. Professional public opinion experienced its first disappointment at the beginning of September when Gabor Banyai—he had arrived at MTV with the president and was immediately appointed managing director—prepared a "compilation" of the studies on the television network's future, but it was so selective and completely one-sided that it aroused a series of objections from "dissidents."

Thereafter months passed in complete silence. Employees suspected that something was brewing only from statements by Hankiss and Banyai to the press. Morale within the institution deteriorated increasingly. A feeling of uncertainty and helplessness took hold of the employees.

Hankiss's concept, "Principles for Hungarian Television's Reorganization," finally appeared. It was dated 27 November 1990 and stamped "First Outline—Not for Publication." In it Hankiss announced a guiding principle that by now has become one of the main causes of his ignominious failure. It read: "An efficient internal organizational structure must be developed, similar to that of commercial TV networks. The goal is to create a television network that is commercial television in its organization and business strategy, but a public service in its objectives and quality." The essence of Hankiss's concept is the perpetuation of all-round competition. Public-service television competes with the commercial television networks; public-service television's two programs, which are separate organizationally, economically and in terms of programming policy, compete with each other; and the producer's offices formed by abolishing the specialized editorial offices, which are also intellectual workshops, compete with one another for productions. That is the gist of the concept.

Haraszti's Intellectual Fingerprint

This is the national public-service television model with which Elemer Hankiss began the realization of a television network that was to be independent and European in terms of its quality and mentality. But was this truly the concept of Elemer Hankiss, the nonpartisan and free-thinking social scientist?

The July 1991 issue of *TELEHIR* (the MTV employees' magazine) published a report entitled "Is the Boss Free? Opinions Regarding the Frequency Moratorium" on a

conference held in July 1990 (!) and attended by TV experts, politicians, and businessmen.

From that report we quote the following remarks by Miklos Haraszti, "media politician" of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]:

"The SZDSZ fully supports the existence of commercial television while we are catching up with the modern world. At the same time the SZDSZ is aware that, Hungary being a European country which will always remain slightly socialist as compared with overseas countries, we will not be able to rid ourselves of state-run television. To my mind, state television will now remain somehow a part of Hungarian culture, and it could also offer cultural advantages if controlled democratically. We need some sort of balance of the two. Moreover, liberal persuasion suggests that competition is beneficial. Therefore it is good to have two of everything. If there is state television, let there be competition within it. And let state television as a whole compete with commercial television."

The reader is requested to etch into his memory every word of Miklos Haraszti's quoted remarks! For behold, Haraszti's idea is the joint product of the minds of a liberal social scientist and of an independent financial researcher respectively, and has become the program for MTV's reorganization.

But let us examine what the MTV's professional bodies think of this, namely of "Principles for Hungarian Television's Reorganization." The following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the committee of the Hungarian Television Chamber adopted on 12 December 1990:

"To our knowledge, the plan lacks statutory, financial, and labor-law guarantees. It is unwarranted and intolerable to integrate programmers into the central staff, as the first step in the reorganization.

"Although the concept completely disregards the program itself, we are obliged to call attention to the fact that without stable creative collectives (so-called workshops) MTV will become unable to operate."

Following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the leadership of the Television Programmers Association adopted on 13 December 1990:

"The greatest inconsistency of 'Principles' is its failure to take the peculiarities of television work into account, to confirm in their work the programming and personnel staffs that are being organized under special economic laws and regulations within the framework of comprehensive laws, and to reinforce the assumed indivisible responsibility for the program."

The following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the committee of the Chamber of Television Producers adopted on 13 December 1990:

"We are in agreement on the need for MTV's sensible renewal, but our basic opinion is that MTV's most important functions, programming and production, are not even mentioned in the principles for reorganization. However, MTV's highest managing organs and their structure, the bureaucratic maze, are discussed in fairly great detail."

The following is an excerpt from the crisis-management program that the secretariat of the Television Programmers Association elaborated on 29 December 1990 and 2 January 1991:

"The reorganization must be suspended immediately. The offices of the editors in chief should continue their programming, to the extent that the shrinking economic possibilities and program time allow. At the same time, a network of decentralized specialized editorial offices should be set up; as of January 1992, these offices—perhaps already as producer's offices—could assume functions of the offices of the editors in chief. By then the offices of the editors in chief could be abolished, without any hitch in programming."

The following is an excerpt from the 2 January 1991 joint standpoint of the 10 organizations participating in the Television Council for the Reconciliation of interests (TET):

"The TET concedes the need for MTV's reorganization. But it establishes that the reorganization proposals presented so far essentially jeopardize MTV's ability to function."

Reform Without Reformers

Disregarding the opinions of the professional organizations, Elemer Hankiss proceeded with full speed to carry out MTV's planned reorganization. On 7 February 1991, also in view of the already mentioned standpoint of the TET, the National Assembly's Cultural Committee questioned Elemer Hankiss about MTV's proposed reorganization. The several hundred pages of the minutes reveal that the members of the committee were full of misgivings. On 13 March 1991, in the debate on the radio and television bill's concept, the Cultural Committee suddenly realized that the new chiefs "with full authority" at the helm of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television had set in motion, "without statutory authority" in Denes Csegey's words, a reorganization process that would confront the legislative branch with an accomplished fact. Warnings, by the National Assembly's Cultural Committee and then by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, to the media chiefs—that they must refrain from making irreversible organizational changes until the passage of the radio and television bill—were in vain: Csaba Gombar and Elemer Hankiss proceeded with full determination to put in place the new organizational structures, to cancel popular programs one after the other, to begin the uncontrollable squandering of public funds, and to hold a clearance sale of public television through questionable business contracts. Meanwhile the Office of the State Auditor General was conducting an audit at

MTV, and the Hungarian press echoed with television scandals. The situation of the institution's employees was becoming entirely uncertain and they feared losing their livelihood. Production was faltering, and technological discipline was breaking down.

In that situation and "in full awareness of their responsibility," the 14 professional and labor organizations representing the interests of 85 percent of MTV's employees wrote a letter amounting to a cry for help, to President of the Republic Arpad Goncz, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee:

"As a result of its reorganization, Hungarian Television has practically become unable to function. There is complete anarchy in its organization and work processes," the letter emphasizes. After a summary of events and facts, it continues:

"We turn to the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee with the request that they take immediate steps to prevent the complete disintegration of a national institution that is still publicly owned. Please help to extricate MTV from the continuing and ever deeper crisis, so that there may emerge a truly public-service Hungarian Television serving society."

"We are willing to provide every professional assistance to that end."

"At the same time, the signatory organizations wish to distance themselves from any intention to use this letter for political purposes."

It is noteworthy that MTV's professional collectives, distancing themselves from any political intention, wish to act emphatically on a professional basis in calling to the attention of the country's highest responsible officials and body the intolerable situation that Hankiss's dictatorship has created, and in requesting a speedy solution.

Who Is Out of Step?

Meanwhile Elemer Hankiss called an institutional "production" conference for 30 May 1991, by means of invitations posted in the corridors. (It was typical of the prevailing mood that someone corrected the word "termelési" [production] to read "temetési" [wake].)

The conference held in Studio IV began in a stormy mood and ended in a row. The first speaker, Peter Feledy, called on Elemer Hankiss to resign for reasons of incompetence. (The minutes of the conference were published in the July 1991 issue of TELEHIR.) The employees' anger was directed primarily at Gabor Banyai, in addition to Hankiss himself. Katalin Szegvari: "It certainly is not good when falsehoods are published about a person in the press. We too have experienced that, thanks to Gabor Banyai's article. He was the first one in the Hungarian press to use us as a doormat, to

discredit us severally and collectively in VILAG." Istvan Lenart: "I think that blunders are being committed one after the other. It is questionable when MTV claims to be dying for lack of cash and too month later wants to double its air time. We seem to be scoring against ourselves at every step. I will repeat what I told Elemer Hankiss in private. I think he started out initially under the misconception that Gabi Banyai has at his fingertips everything there is to know about MTV. The other big trouble was that he [Banyai] thought so too." The row erupted when in his contribution Gabor Banyai slapped his colleagues in the face with his arrogant self-importance and cynical condescension. All hell broke loose from there on. Disregarding all democratic rules of the game, Hankiss responded with a series of reprisals against even the slightest criticism.

The Hungarian Television Chamber cannot be accused of being progovernment, and it had not signed the letter of the 14 organizations. Its standpoint, published in the 18 June 1991 issue of NEPSZABADSAG, read in part:

"We find that the processes which determine the fate of the most important mass medium have reached the stage where the threat of their becoming irreversible and permanently uncontrollable is all too real. One proof of this is the daily exodus of experts without whom MTV's operations cannot be imagined. The primary cause of the evolved situation is that to this day the government, the political parties, and parliament in general have failed to put in place the economic and legal conditions for television broadcasting.

"Another decisive element in this situation within the MTV is that its president and his immediate associates are by now demonstrably unsuitable for managing the institution and are unable to control the processes they set in motion. As a result, they have become isolated and have lost their authority.

"We deplore the MTV president's crude, personal and unjust attack against the top official of the Television Workers Trade Union. We condemn any attempt to conceal in the guise of a political threat the helplessness and professional incompetence of the president and some of his associates, which in itself contributes toward making the institution a scene of political skirmishing."

The next day NEPSZABADSAG published an interview with Peter Rozsa, the president of the Hungarian Television Chamber, by Gyula Varsanyi. The following is an excerpt from that interview:

[Rozsa] The situation is deteriorating gradually. The president pretends to be above it all. He starts out from excellent theoretical schemes and is unwilling to take into consideration that the final objective after all is the production and broadcasting of specific programs. The president's reorganization plan presupposes a market structure and a regulatory regime that do not yet exist. The president has admitted that momentarily his systems approach does not take talent, knowledge and popularity adequately into consideration; in other

words, everything that is the most important in preparing programs. It is a different matter that, in his opinion, this is just a temporary disturbance and everything will fall into shape again.

[Varsanyi] But you people have written that the current president is incompetent.

[Rozsa] Yes, incompetent because he has put the institution's operating mechanism out of kilter. Why was it necessary to push through changes at such speed? Why has he been overhasty? And why is it now necessary to manage by presidential directive?

Reading L.P.'s "media file," one must sadly establish that had there been the least bit of progress in recent months, the situation would not have deteriorated to where the prime minister is forced to raise the question of Hankiss's suitability. I wonder when the parliamentary parties, the ruling coalition and the opposition will all come to realize that they made a mistake in July 1990 when they chose Elemer Hankiss, the eminent political scientist but an incompetent MTV president and terrible manager?

In conclusion, one more excerpt—from Elemer Hankiss's essay dated 20 June 1990, which he submitted to the National Assembly's Cultural Committee at the time of his hearing prior to his appointment:

"My primary goal is to start a process of change that will produce within a year or two a Hungarian television system of high quality and European mentality, able to compete also internationally. In other words, a system that provides truthful, impartial, and responsible information; offers entertainment of high quality; and fosters Hungarian and European cultural traditions."

The undertaken year or two have elapsed. Let the reader and the millions of viewers decide whether anything has been achieved of the set objectives.

TV President Elemer Hankiss Interviewed

92CH0528A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 13 Apr 92 p 9

[Interview with Elemer Hankiss, president of Hungarian Television, by Andras Ranki; place and date not given: "Who Should Be in the Dock?"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] If anyone is to be put in the dock in the Hungarian Television [MTV] affair, it should be the right wing of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], the nationalist and jingoist group within MTV that is attempting to seize control, claims Elemer Hankiss, the president of MTV. Before his departure last Saturday for a two-week stay in America, he gave our paper an interview. Commenting on his relations with the prime minister, he said: "Perhaps today our concepts regarding certain elements of the democratic political system are already different, and that too may have contributed to the

present conflict, which is a legal conflict rather than a personal one." According to Hankiss, his absence will not influence the parliamentary investigation, and it will be possible to conduct the committee hearings as scheduled.

[Ranki] You are drawing political assault fire and are leaving for America, while here at home a parliamentary investigation is about to start. What kind of situation do you expect to find here on your return after an absence of two weeks?

[Hankiss] I spoke with Laszlo Salamon, the chairman of the Constitutional Committee. The hearings will begin next week at the earliest and could drag on for several weeks. By the time I return two weeks later, we could very well be at the same point where we are now.

[Ranki] Since autumn and then after the "religious war" last winter, the ruling parties' ever fiercer attacks have shifted from Hungarian Radio to MTV, from Csaba Gombar to Elemer Hankiss. What could have caused this shift?

[Hankiss] There are or could have been several reasons. Since December 1990, certain circles within the ruling parties have been increasingly dissatisfied with my performance. For them the fact that a few months ago I launched *Egyenleg* [Balance], the second TV news program, was probably the last straw. A contributing factor might have been the further worsening of relations in recent months between me and several of my colleagues. For instance, the editors in chief of *Hirado* and *Panorama* who, to my knowledge, are in close contact with the aforementioned circles. I think it is very likely that the antipathy and aspirations of these colleagues also played a role in the launching of the present attacks. To my knowledge, they do not even deny this. But it is they you ought to be asking about this.

[Ranki] The attacks are directed against your person, but what is actually at stake here is MTV's independence. Let us assume that Elemer Hankiss is replaced. Will it then be possible to guarantee MTV's independence?

[Hankiss] That would depend on two things. First, on the new Media Law. If it emerges as a good law, then it will guarantee—at least legally and formally—MTV's independence, partially of the government, and partially of the ruling parties or any other political party or political force. That could be a guarantee that MTV's already existing autonomy will be protected, regardless of who its next president is. Of course, much will depend also on the person of my successor. Everywhere in the world, laws and individuals jointly constitute functioning systems of institutions. The second condition, therefore, is that the parliamentary parties find and agree on a person who has the intention, as well as the moral courage and nerve, to resist any attempts at influencing him.

[Ranki] Thus we have a real conflict, further intensified by the fact that the legal and institutional statuses are not

entirely clear; including, for instance, the labor-law relationship between the president and vice president. It is good that this conflict has surfaced, you said recently.

[Hankiss] Yes, that is true. This dispute erupted from my having instituted disciplinary proceedings against Vice President Nahlik. Here in Hungary, to my knowledge, the courts are the last resort for the resolution of such labor disputes. Of course, every professional opinion may be important in this matter. I read with interest the supreme state prosecutor's opinion and keenly await what standpoint the Constitutional Committee will adopt. The conflict is good because the rules of the game will be clarified. As an example, I will cite merely one point that needs clarification. According to Law No. 57/1990 on Appointing the Presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, the presidents must be politically independent. That is in everyone's interest. However, if some statutory regulations of a lower order were to say—they do not say so in my opinion, but the government's experts contend that they do; hence the dispute that must be decided—that the government's authority over the presidents of Hungarian Radio and MTV respectively extends to its ability to institute disciplinary proceedings against them at any time, to suspend them, or just to determine their salaries, that would give the government opportunity to influence them. Which in its turn would diametrically conflict with the higher-order statutory regulation, with the law that already exists and would like to guarantee the presidents' independence.

[Ranki] According to your critics, the source of much trouble is that MTV's internal rules of organization and procedure are not ready, although the prime minister has repeatedly urged their completion.

[Hankiss] That is not our fault. In one year we submitted four drafts of what we thought were good rules of organization and procedure. The latest draft, the fourth one, was submitted on 30 March. We have done everything possible to have rules of organization and procedure, because orderly operation is also in our own interest. I fervently hope the fourth draft will be approved. The government has the right and duty to review the rules from the viewpoint of legality, and then to approve them or to withhold approval. But the government, I suspect, believes it has authority to review also substantive questions. That, too, could be one of the sources of the dispute. Up to now three drafts have been rejected, primarily because the definition of the vice presidents' purviews had not been specific enough. We never knew how many vice presidents there would eventually be: one, two, or three? Not knowing the intended number of vice presidents, it was very difficult to define their purviews.

[Ranki] Has your dispute with Vice President Gabor Nahlik been settled?

[Hankiss] He received a disciplinary reprimand, and that has ended his suspension. Relations between us are

normal. I have defined the scope of his duties, and he has confirmed its acceptance with his signature. We have incorporated his job description in the rules of organization and procedure. I have also specified his authority to act for me in my absence; it is his duty and responsibility to maintain, ensure and oversee the day-to-day operations of MTV. He may submit proposals also in all other areas, but I reserve the strategic decisions for myself; he alone may not make such decisions. Such decisions are enumerated in the presidential directive. Without my authorization, he may not decide personnel matters. In other words, he may present proposals for restructuring MTV and may draft plans, but may not act on them without my permission.

[Ranki] Referring to this, an author in UJ MAGYARORSZAG wrote: "We may safely say that such a malicious and demeaning definition of duties has no precedent this century."

[Hankiss] That is nonsense. The vice president's duties are defined in 14 points. He has not only accepted and signed them, but has done so gratefully. He has been given exceptionally important and difficult matters to resolve.

[Ranki] The attacks against MTV do not always reveal what is actually involved. There are attacks against the editorial policy on programming, with demands for some sort of Christian Nationalist mentality on the one hand. On the other, the jingoist news programs of the Palfy and Chrudinak type are being attacked, with demands for objectivity. To my mind, it is rather questionable when the head of an independent institution admits that the most important—because it has the highest rating—news program is not objective and, to counterbalance this, he launches another news program, although it really does strive for objectivity. In the final outcome, we have not reached the point where the Hungarian television viewer can sit down and watch a news program that the network itself regards as objective, impartial and relevant.

[Hankiss] That is a very complex question. Let me try to untangle its several threads. First, I do not claim to possess the ability to decide by myself what qualifies as objective truth in Hungary today. In a country where everything has turned topsy-turvy and in the process of reorganization, the situation of journalists—and I do not mean just our TV reporters—is extremely difficult. Secondly, under such conditions I can readily imagine the [state] network broadcasting several news programs. And with the arrival of privately owned TV networks there will be not two, but three, four or five news programs. The combined efforts, mistakes and truths of the four or five TV news programs will jell into something approximating a kind of objectivity. We find also in other countries examples of inability or unwillingness to find a single TV news program that embodies and broadcasts Rousseau's general interest, a general objectivity. In Italy there are three central TV channels: one is managed by the Christian Democrats, another is assigned to the

Socialists, and the third belongs to the Communists; and the newscasts of the three are certainly not identical. In the Netherlands the TV channels have been divided among the political parties, churches and social movements. But this does not mean the absence of journalistic norms that every news program must observe. Our first news program [*Hirado*] has frequently violated the requirements of objectivity, creating much internal controversy and resulting even in disciplinary action.

[Ranki] In other words, you launched *Egyenleg* in an attempt to counterbalance Palfy's progovernment news program.

[Hankiss] I never said that Palfy's *Hirado* is progovernment. During the past 18 months, in my opinion, *Hirado* has done at least as much harm to the government as to the country and to the opposition. Indeed, perhaps even more. *Hirado* and *A Het* [*The Week in Review*] err when they interpret facts, well-meaningly in all likelihood, but in the spirit of a misconstrued nationalist, populist, Narodnik mentality. They think that they alone are the guardians and embodiments of the nation's, society's general interest. Anyone who views the country's destiny differently is a traitor. They sincerely believe this and have a right to their opinion, but as journalists they ought to have some self-criticism, self-irony, or self-control. I accept that they are the victims of a well-meaning misconception, believing that in the given situation their truth is what should be broadcast, and not necessarily the objective facts. But I repeat, this conflicts with the norms of journalism that we have accepted as standards; hence in this form it cannot be tolerated permanently in television. The idea of launching *Egyenleg*, or rather a second news program, arose almost immediately after I came here in 1990. We held a competition for essays [on what a second news program should offer], and the essays were ready by March. That is when we should have launched the second news program. We were forced to delay the launching until late autumn. Once when things are quieter, I will write its history. But I would like to go on record already now that I did not launch *Egyenleg* to counterbalance the deviations of Palfy's newscasts, as a liberal or pro-opposition news program competing with *Hirado* which—and this I wish to emphasize—is "populist-minded" rather than progovernment. I sought people whom I felt I could trust, and I gave them opportunity to prove that they are able to produce an impartial news program in the spirit of European journalism, a program that does not lean toward the government, the opposition or in any other direction. The way I see it, *Egyenleg* has a very good chance of carrying out this assignment, but it still needs time to prove this definitely.

[Ranki] Your opinion of one of the most important programs on MTV being so devastating, what means does the TV president have at his disposal to remedy the situation? And how can you tolerate that your employees are attacking you continually in public?

[Hankiss] I would not say that my opinion is devastating. That is perhaps your opinion. Allow me to express myself with more nuance than that. Despite all its professional problems, *Hirado* has improved considerably during the past 18 months, especially since *Egyenleg* has been running. The competition has been decidedly beneficial. That is one thing. Another thing is the simultaneous existence in Hungary today of several great political cultures side by side, and the question arises whether the social groups embracing different political cultures do not have a right to hear world news presented according to their own mentality—up to a certain point that does not include the falsification of news reports. Thus when I let Palfy's news program continue, a role in this is played also by the fact that a significant proportion of Hungarian society finds the program's mentality and language familiar and to its liking. That political culture tends to think more in terms of nation than of society. It uses the language mostly of late 19th century European democracies, rather than of today's Western European ones; and it offers more scope for traditions and sentiments than for critical analyses. Of course, that in itself is nothing bad because such a political culture, too, has merit. But I regret that *Hirado* has not made use of the past 18 months to help its viewers master late 20th century critical thinking. Yet they probably knew as well as I did that Hungarian society is a far more complex structure than to lend itself to description merely with the categories "nation" and "Hungarian people." These are very important categories, but they must be built into an intricate and complex social system. Every one of our programs ought to help achieve this. My last comment is that I would find *Hirado* more acceptable if it were speaking Jozsef Antall's language and thinking in terms of his categories. What I find very unacceptable is that it speaks Istvan Csurka's language and thinks in terms of his categories—especially without Istvan Csurka's literary flashes and virtuosity.

[Ranki] If I understood you correctly, you would find *Hirado* more tolerable if it were openly progovernment and conveyed, say, Jozsef Antall's thinking?

[Hankiss] I could not accept its being progovernment, but I could accept if it were thinking in terms of Jozsef Antall's political categories and attempting to interpret reality with their help. Not to Jozsef Antall's taste, not to the government's taste, but in the country's interest. The categories of Jozsef Antall's thinking and political philosophy are suitable for interpreting Hungarian society's present state intelligently, usefully and progressively. Although I do not wish to offend Istvan Csurka as a person, I think that the kind of sentimental, passionate mentality packaged in demagoguery, which he willy-nilly radiates, is unsuitable to help Hungarian society understand its situation, tasks, obligations and opportunities now at the end of the 20th century, and to recognize the dangers threatening it.

[Ranki] There is a constitutional dispute between the prime minister and the MTV president. Is there also a personal conflict behind it?

[Hankiss] I am not aware of any personal conflict, and I harbor no antipathy for the prime minister. As I have related earlier, he and I were close friends in the 1950's, members of a small circle. We literally hung on Jozsef Antall's every word, because he had the best grasp of Hungarian political history among us, and in general of European history as well. Then we did not meet for a long time. I was pleased when he became prime minister, because he is a person of outstanding erudition who has an excellent theoretical knowledge of politics. Later on I saw that he is at home also in practical politics. During the past 10 to 20 years I too have been closely involved in politics, professionally. Perhaps today our concepts regarding certain elements of the democratic political system are already different, and that too may have contributed to the present conflict, which is a legal conflict rather than a personal one. I believe he favors primarily the Anglo-Saxon, Westminster model of democracy; and if I am mistaken, he will surely correct me. That model is practically unique in Europe. It offers essentially absolute power to the prime minister who exercises full authority over the executive branch—as well as his own party—and wields exceptional influence also over the legislative branch. The West European democracies guarantee much broader rights inside and outside their parliaments to the opposition, various minorities and society's autonomous institutions, at the expense of the government's and the prime minister's power. They produce a varied balancing act and interaction between the government and the other autonomous institutions. In East Europe, in my opinion, even greater emphasis ought to be placed on the Western European pluralistic model; on the need to jointly do everything possible in the interest of letting autonomous institutions, bodies, movements, and local government develop and grow, beside and at the expense of the government's power. A great curse of Hungary's is that central power during the past four centuries was always too strong. The new democracy in a country such as ours ought to devote special attention to strengthening the barely existing autonomies, at the expense of central power. In this situation I believe that it is not my personal cause and not MTV's cause that we defend and strengthen MTV's autonomy, which has successfully evolved during the past 1.5 to two years. In his exposition when he introduced in parliament the nomination bill that eventually became Law No. 57/1990, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall argued at length that it was necessary for Hungarian Radio and MTV to become autonomous institutions. I can imagine that the prime minister sees a need for a stronger government in order to manage the transition well. And thinks that the evolution of the balance and interaction of autonomous institutions must be deferred for later. There is extensive debate on this in East Europe. Many people are saying how fortunate the Czechs were that Havel had been able to direct the reorganization practically alone from November 1989 until the the summer of 1991. And how difficult it was for Jozsef Antall to have to govern with a complicated multiparty parliament. It can be argued that a firm hand is needed on the tiller when sailing such stormy waters.

But I argue in favor of having to accept the greater burden and the more complicated problems that are the concomitants of democracy resulting from the interaction of autonomous institutions during such a transitional period. Because in Central Europe there is great danger in every country that central power may become too strong.

[Ranki] And how long will MTV President Elemer Hankiss accept that burden and wage that struggle?

[Hankiss] Until the republic's president relieves me of my post. I will resign voluntarily and gladly, and go back to my profession, when a good Media Law will have been enacted, and the parliamentary parties will have reached a consensus on choosing my successor.

[Ranki] Another line of attack is that bankruptcy, chaos and corruption are rampant at MTV, for which you are being put in the dock.

[Hankiss] If not in the dock for prisoners on trial, perhaps in the dock for unsuitable chief executives. In spite of all the problems, the network's reorganization has been successful. Our economic results have been enormous. I hardly think there are many Hungarian institutions which have adapted to new market conditions so successfully during the past 18 months as we have. But credit for that should go to the economic managers, not to me.

[Ranki] This conflicts diametrically with your vice president's statement that MTV is insolvent.

[Hankiss] He must have said that on the basis of wrong information. MTV was not insolvent then and is not insolvent now, despite the fact that one million [as published] forints of its subsidy from the state budget has been frozen. I have already said, but it will be even better if it also appears in print, that MTV's cost to produce one minute of program time was 9,000 forints in 1986 and 11,000 forints in 1991. The planned cost for 1992 is 11,500 forints. That is at most a 30-percent rise in production costs in six years. In contrast to a cumulative inflation rate of 160 to 170 percent reported for the same period by the KSH [Central Statistical Office]. And to the fact that television costs everywhere in the world have increased substantially faster than the countries' average rates of inflation. And we achieved this without laying off hundreds of television workers. I could cite numerous other examples to refute the rumors and libels that people are spreading and committing, without investigating the facts.

[Ranki] Who is in the dock after all?

[Hankiss] If there is a dock in this case—the question of my suitability is immaterial in that respect and only serves to divert attention from what is essential—then the political pressure group within MTV ought to be put in it which is attempting to seize control for itself.

[Ranki] Would you identify them?

[Hankiss] The right wing of the MDF, its populist and jingoist wing—I do not have exact concepts to describe them. I cannot call them a popular nationalist orientation because, to my mind, that dual concept conveys real value, and I do not think this group embodies that value. This group has openly declared that it will occupy MTV. They are demanding my resignation, and that the MDF must have greater influence over the medium than it now has. I am able to accept that any political group would like to gain influence over television. There are fairly many examples of this in every country. But it is obvious that every political factor must observe the law. The prime minister acted correctly and legally when, as the first step, he requested the National Assembly's Cultural Committee to investigate my suitability. If also others observe the statutory regulations, then it undoubtedly will be possible to resolve the present conflict. My duty within this is to defend MTV's autonomy, in the spirit of the laws and regulations that are in force.

[Ranki] In your opinion, then, those ought to be put in the dock who are attacking MTV's independence and autonomy?

[Hankiss] Yes. And demonstrations ought to be directed against those who deserve them.

[Ranki] You are referring to the demonstration on March 15th?

[Hankiss] Yes. The demonstrators were those victims of 1956 with whom I had sat in prison. That in itself does not matter. But they were demonstrating on behalf of people who within MTV had been important cadres under the former political system. I do not wish to name names or to offend anyone, but I must tell you what the general mood within the network is. When the vice president was appointed in my absence and those five persons gathered around him who seemed to want to establish their own power, my colleagues welcomed me back with the words: "Christ! The old party committee is back!" And they said this because two among the five had been party secretaries at MTV. A third one had been a member of the party committee for many years. The fourth had been the chief of personnel and then the head of the president's office for ten years. And it turned out that these same five persons have close links to the right wing of the MDF. It is ironic that the demonstrators are demonstrating on behalf of people who actually had been against them under the previous political system.

[Ranki] We began with America and let us end with this question: Is it wise that you have to spend weeks and months in America?

[Hankiss] I used only my annual vacation to go to America and did not request leave without pay. Several times I had postponed by six months the fulfillment of my contract—about which the prime minister and also Arpad Goncz knew at the time of my appointment—because I felt that I had to be at MTV. Finally, in January of this year I was no longer able to postpone my departure without committing

suicide in my professional life, and without irretrievably losing my international reputation. Every scientist in the world would be happy to accept an invitation from the university where I will be teaching. I undertook to teach two half-semester of 10 weeks each. I have already completed the first 10 weeks. My contract has been cancelled. The university was entitled to cancel it because I am unable to fulfill the stipulated conditions. That is just not done to a

private university. In spite of this, I will still be going there three times in the coming months, for two weeks each time. By condensing the material, I will be able to complete my lectures. In between I will be constantly here in Hungary. I have checked my own schedule with Ferenc Kulin, the chairman of the Cultural Committee. The hearings will be able to proceed as scheduled. I will be there. I have nothing to fear.

KPN: History, Present Aspirations Discussed

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in Polish No 15, 12 Apr 92 pp 1, 5

[Article by Michal Okonski and Adam Szostkiewicz:
"KPN: Confederation for an Independent Poland Five
Minutes to Twelve?"]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] ended a certain era, both in the history of the organization itself, as well as in the history of Poland. The organization changes its laws and leadership (although Leszek Moczulski still remains at the head). And Poland is already, as the leader of the confederation said, "substantially" independent. A line from the Legionnaires' hymn was chosen as the session's motto: "They said we are foolish, did not believe in us (in the original 'in that,') that to want is to be able."

Conference, Conference, Conference

One could encounter the first delegates, with party badges on their lapels, on the morning express trains. They came from Nowy Sacz, Tarnow, and Krakow. During the trip they read GAZETA WYBORCZA, DZIENNIK POLSKI, KOBIETA I MEZCZYZNA, NIE, WPROST, and NIEDZIELA. "We are not an ideological party," it was said later at the Congress.

In front of the former CUP [Central Planning Administration] building, where the congress was held ("The hall and acoustics have seen better days, but we are paying only 3 million zlotys [Z] a day in rent," it was said in the press office), it was already crowded. In order to get inside, it was first necessary to pass through the first line of defense. Then accreditation, and another check in front of the conference hall, this time more scrupulous. Identification issued by the head of the press office was not enough for the broad shouldered man. A press pass and personal identification were required. "There was a series of stupid jokes about a bomb being planted. We did not want some joke to disrupt our congress," said KPN deputy speaker Dariusz Wojcik at the press conference. The guards behaved as if Leszek Moczulski himself might have one of those planting a bomb. During the entire congress a "shadow" identified as "Fourth Congress chief of security" accompanied Moczulski.

It began at exactly five to twelve with a standing ovation of several minutes and chants of "Leszek, Leszek." More than 300 delegates from Poland and abroad greeted the KPN chairman. Three verses of "First Brigade" were sung (for those who did not remember the lyrics, the text was prepared on the fourth page of the binding of the congress' documents) and the colors were presented. The color guard was composed of young people in green uniforms and visored caps (members of "Strzelec," a paramilitary youth organization of the KPN), preceded by a saber-wielding Polish army colonel. "You can see what a beautiful uhlan we have," said Leszek Moczulski's son-in-law, Krzysztof Krol, in the lobby.

Conference Routine

What happened afterwards did not differ much from similar rituals of other parties. The KPN chairman's speech (Moczulski spoke from memory for 45 minutes), the platform report, appearances of invited guests. Only one of the delegates disrupted the general harmony when, after the question: "Would any other of the guests like to speak?" he raised his hand, then proposed a resolution of thanks to Radio Free Europe and, as he said, to national hero Jan Nowak-Jezioranski. A small scandal ensued. Standing among the reporters, Maria Moczulska, wife of the chairman and a delegate, exploded: "When my husband was sitting in prison, we insisted that information about it be issued." "RFE [Radio Free Europe] was silent, while Nowak-Jezioranski called us fascists," the indignant delegates said. Immediately, a 20-minute break was announced, after which there was no further mention of the ill-fated resolution. No doubt with an eye toward avoiding similar incidents, the doors remained closed throughout discussion on the by-laws and platform and the elections. The more inquisitive reporters lay in wait between the cloakroom and buffet for those leaving the hall.

The next day one could hear interesting things in the lobby. Indeed, the time of divisions and deviations among KPN members that occurred for various reasons—previous congresses had ended, but a preelection fever infected many delegates. At the buffet, the sale of beer was halted, even though there was still plenty in reserve. In various places, in front of the restroom for example, one could see small groups of conspirators. There was talk of "cutting off Warsaw," about "horizontal agreements" between regions. Only a group of young people, clearly isolated from the rest of the delegates, did not succumb to emotion.

The youngest KPN delegate was nine years old on 1 September 1979 when the Founder's Document of the party was read at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In both the KPN Parliamentary Club and the new Political Council one can see more people under age 30. They have an excellent presence; superbly dressed, one of the youngest delegates, from Krakow incidentally, made an even bigger impression with a notebook computer on which he was heatedly revising a draft of the KPN bylaws. They do not resemble representatives of an "electorate of the dissatisfied." Leszek Moczulski willingly emphasizes that the KPN is the party of the future. And they are serene. They state unanimously that the future belongs to them, and not just the future of the confederation. From the beginning of the Polish independence movement, of which KPN views itself as a perpetuator, much has already been divided them.

"The Afflicted"

The democratic opposition did not like the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and the communist

leaders persecuted it even during the 500 days of post-August freedom. Taunts, attacks through PRL propaganda and repression, the confederation operated in such an atmosphere until the late 1980's. Within the Workers Defense Committee opposition, KPN members had the reputation of "afflicted," independence-minded fundamentalists who took out their frustrations in ostensible action. Ostensible, because from the very observance of patriotic anniversaries—it was said—communism could not fall. Letting off steam in the "rhetoric of action" chafed as much as did the paramilitary organizational structure of the KPN. Imitating the occupation resistance movement was seen as grotesque and offensive, and dangerous besides, because it increased susceptibility to infiltration and provocation on the part of the SB [Security Service]. The confederation did not remain indebted and accused the Workers Defense Committee circle of attempting to come to terms with the PZPR at the cost of discarding its fundamental objective: attaining independence.

Falls and Rises

But after August, the KPN called attention to itself when the movement of committees for the Defense of Prisoners of Conscience was developed in Poland. It organized under the banner of liberating KPN members arrested just a few months after the accords were signed: Moczulski, Szeremietiew, Stanski, and Jandziszak. Certain high school and college youth eagerly joined in the committees' work. The KPN also stood out in its influence in the worker circles of Gdansk, Krakow, and Silesia. The consistent logic of the KPN's activity, which attempted to win members and sympathizers in such sensitive trade groups as freight handling and transportation, was noticed. The trial of the four activists began in June 1981 in Warsaw. The indictment charged them with attempting to overthrow the PRL system by force. The KPN leaders answered that their activity did not break Polish law—Wanda Falkowski wrote in *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSCI* (No. 17) that Moczulski asserted he had always respect the PRL's legal system—since it did not forbid the formation of political parties and respected freedom of speech, assembly and demonstrations. It was also difficult to see incitement to massacre in the motto on the KPN's flag: "Revolution without revolution." "Poles do not like blood," Leszek Moczulski says years later, "it is the Russians that love to cut each other up." The trial wore on past 13 December, when the defendants were taken over by the military court, which in October 1982 sentenced Moczulski to seven years, Szeremietiew and Stanski to five, Jandziszak to a two-year suspended sentence.

The KPN returned to the scene during the 1988 strikes, which its members supported. It boycotted the Roundtable, but neither was the confederation invited to the discussions. It entered the elections in June 1989 independently. And it lost. Its leader vied for a deputy seat in Krakow. He received just under 11 percent of the vote; his rival from the Solidarity slate, Jan Rokita, received nearly 80 percent. Local elections came in May 1990. In

all of Poland there were 50,000 seats to be filled; the KPN won 57 (1 percent of the vote). Moczulski again lost in his own electoral district. Undaunted, seven months later he entered the battle for the Presidency. He and his television majordomo in a bow tie, Pawel Solski, occasioned fairly universal public amusement. Anticommunism and independence—the two basic threads around which Moczulski wove his television speeches to the nation—were viewed by opinionmaking circles as a completely misguided anachronism. And once again Moczulski lost utterly. Despite this, he said with a smile that society would soon mature to the KPN's program.

Coming Out of the Shadows

Last year's elections to the Sejm and Senate were the turning point. Preelection polls traditionally did not forecast its ultimate success. Yet KPN won 7.5 percent of the votes and 51 seats in parliament. In Krakow, Moczulski took revenge on Rokita: He won 10,000 more votes. The people had concealed their preferences before the elections. They were embarrassed to admit that they wanted to vote for a party outside Solidarity's camp. The secret of the KPN's successful campaign was apparently based on the fact that the slogan "Give us a chance!" won over part of the frustrated electorate. The voters believed that the KPN was an alternative to both the Solidarity camp and the postcommunists. The fact that it had operated for many years outside the mainstream of Solidarity proved to be a skillfully played trump card. The KPN had not "tarnished itself" with power, and so it was able to arouse animated hope for change. The KPN's electorate is composed of mainly professionally active men, age 25 to 29, generally with a secondary education, employees in the public sector with not particularly high incomes (Z1.5 million). Every third one is a skilled laborer, every fourth a resident of the larger cities. It is also a stable electorate—nearly 80 percent of the October supporters of the KPN would vote the same way today—and active: They want to vote. It appears that the KPN is expanding its influence, but it is not going beyond the social groups that have been the party's base since the 1980's. One might presume that political radicalism will continue in these groups, and in this sense the KPN is destined to continue its rhetoric, because otherwise it will lose its social anchor. For the same reason the real moment of truth for the KPN will be the hour of its entry into the structures of state power: From that time on, the myth of its political virginity will cease to operate.

After the announcement of the October election results, political and opinionmaking circles began to revise their attitude toward the KPN. The isolation was broken. Contempt and distrust were replaced by a mixture of anxiety and amazement. But the success was relative, as Leszek Moczulski perceived; he said in an interview statement: "I will win this war! Because others lost a great deal and gained little, the KPN, which has not been in the Sejm, has only ostensibly achieved a great deal." In any event, today politicians and commentators are in agreement that the confederation can no longer be

ignored. Some even add that one can learn something from it. Although privately, leading politicians still treat the KPN and its leader with suspicion, they are beginning to take it into consideration in their political calculations. The president of the ZChN [Christian National Union], the heads of the PSL [Polish Peasants Party] and People's Accord found the time to visit the KPN Fourth Congress; Prime Minister Olszewski sent a very warm letter, and letters also came from Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Professor Geremek. The process of reevaluation has just begun: While speaker Chrzanowski, in his speech to the delegates at the KPN Congress, declared a significant concurrence of opinion, his party colleague and head of the parliamentary faction of ZChN, Stefan Niesiolowski, still views the KPN as an unpredictable party.

We Are All Populists

The KPN willingly classifies itself as a "populist" party. Given Polish realities, this is neither a compliment nor a descriptive formula. Krzysztof Krol retorts that every party is populist because it seeks voter support. "We are the party of the independence movement," said "Commander" Moczulski himself at the congress. "The reporters call us Pilsudskiites. To us Pilsudski...is something more than one can imagine. We see ourselves as only his inept pupils. To us he still our commander, although he is no longer in this world. But Pilsudskiites do not say they are a Pilsudskiite movement. We are an independence movement and the center of state thought.

Who knows if the emotional tone of these political declarations did not draw to the KPN the majority of its supporters. In that part of society at which the confederation's language and style of operation are aiming, there is a hunger that cannot be satisfied by formulas of pragmatism and responsibility for the state. They are too abstract, too washed of feeling. Independence and military symbolism and ritual are their opposites. One can identify with this personally. Attacks from the outside merely strengthen the spirit of brotherhood of action and struggle. Advocates of the thesis that after the fall of communism there is again rising a demand for politics that appeal to such elementary psychological needs as the need for community, a tribal leader, and a clear and simple catalog of principles and watchwords that bring order to the world's confusion, can point to the KPN's success. One could call this populism, but such populism—the constant appeal in politics to "ordinary people," which it wants to represent and protect from the imagined or real manipulations of authority—has always been present in the political philosophy and practice of many Western democratic parties, the British Conservatives, for example.

The trouble with populism is that, although it cuts a path to governance, after assuming power it is faced with a painful dilemma. It is necessary to retreat from some or all of its promises or blunder ahead, i.e., attempt to make the best of them despite obvious contradictions or impossibilities. Both bring the threat of loss of public

support. That is why contemporary political parties make very careful use of this instrument. Only political debutantes have no reluctance. Surely the KPN's leaders realize that this trap is lying in wait for them. But for now they emphasize that in the event of a conflict within the state, they are on the side of "society." And they add that they have delegated 3,000 activists to places of employment. Officially their goal is supposed to be based on easing social tensions, but one can also see in this move the confederations's establishment of a bridgehead in the union movement and worker circles. Why? Well, that is the basic question. Since the KPN's main objective has—even in its own opinion—been achieved, there can really be only one goal: preparing to assume power.

Words, Words, Words

The numerous documents and publications of the KPN do not impair principles of democracy and parliamentarism. On the contrary, a nonideological functional state that respects civil rights and freedoms was discussed at the congress. Meanwhile, the KPN rejects both the liberal and totalitarian state, because both these systems want to put citizens to their use. On what is this temptation based in the case of a liberal state? To this the KPN says: It wants to build a state that serves citizens and at the same time is a community of citizens. These glib formulas are lacking in concrete, palpable substance, as are generalities dealing with economic matters or foreign policy. The KPN's entire economic program boils down to the catch phrase "creation of money," which takes in the sponge of state industry, the fight against recession and privatization. The confederation does not explain its certain that "created" or empty money will go where it is supposed to go, and will not flow out into an overregulated economic system that impels inflation.

One can accuse their standard's motto, "Intersea" of the same lack of verifiable specificity. There rings in it the echo of the Jagiellonian idea, which pleasantly titillates the national pride of many Poles. The notion of a community of goals and interests of the countries that "freed themselves from Moscow's hegemony and cast off the communist system" may also sound encouraging. But what is to this "Intersea" when Czechoslovakia is splitting at the seams, Yugoslavia has crumbled, Romania is fighting with Hungary, Poland with Lithuania, and all the countries of our region are jostling each other in the race to the till in Brussels? When asked about details, Krzysztof Krol managed to mention only the KPN's good contacts with the Ukrainian ambassador. That is not enough to make of our part of Europe another pillar of Pan European integration.

The confederation has spoken our most extensively on matters of the system of government. Drafts of a minor and major constitution have been presented; a bill on restoring independence failed in the Sejm. The KPN's proposals on formation of the state sound attractive, as does stressing the notion of responsibility and the Christian nature of a universal system of values. But the

attraction is muted by article 47 of the KPN's bylaws, which state that "members of the KPN who perform work in organs of the government and in state administration may be granted leave from carrying out their duties in KPN structures, but they are bound to implement the political line established by the Political Council." Such an entry opens to us the field for conjecture that the state the KNP would like to build is, in spite of everything, a party state, not a "community of citizens."

Time will tell what the confederation is: a "dark horse" for one political season or a lasting element of the democratic, multiparty system being established in Poland today. Krzysztof Krol is probably right when he answers that the verdict belongs neither to the KPN, nor to the reporters, but to society.

Milewski on Defense Policy, Ministerial Structure

*92EP0405B Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 17, 26 Apr 92 p 22*

[Article by Jan Milewski, minister of state, secretary of state and of the Committee for National Defense, as well as head of the Office of National Defense: "The Army According to Jerzy Milewski: The President's Fist"]

[Text] We asked Minister of National Defense Jan Parys and National Security Bureau Chief Jerzy Milewski the following three questions:

1. What is the practical application of the constitutional principle that the RP [Polish Republic] president is chief of the armed forces?
2. What changes in the MON [National Defense Ministry] structure seem indispensable to you?
3. What should be the shape of Poland's current defense doctrine?

Jan Parys did not reply to these questions; Minister Milewski's statement follows:

1. The RP president is at present chief of the armed forces and chairman of the National Security Council [RBN], which is the organ of defense and state security. These constitutional entries define not so much the scope of powers as they do the responsibility of the RP president for the armed forces and national security. The laws, however, fail to define the executive powers of the president, which make possible his influence over the matters for which he is responsible.

In the future model, which will be defined by the new constitution and other laws, the RP president should be unequivocally the highest superior authority of the soldiers in the area of military command. To this end, we must expand considerably the powers of the president in military cadre matters and in the organization and training of the armed forces. The chief of the General Staff [SG] should be subject directly to the president in these matters.

On the other hand, the civilian minister of national defense, subject to the chairman of the Council of Ministers [RM], should direct military life, plan its development, handle both material and personal procurement and implement the defense policy, broadly understood, of the state in peacetime. The minister should coordinate important decisions both with the prime minister and with the president. Cadre matters in the civilian MON [Ministry of National Defense] would remain in the hands of the minister.

The division of powers and responsibilities among the president, the prime minister, the civilian minister of national defense, and need serial comma after defense the military chief of the SG must be properly adjusted to the powers of the RBN and the RM.

2. Back in last July, the RM made the decision to reform MON. This decision should be implemented. This reform consists primarily of separating the civilian-military ministry from the military section with the SG chief at the head. This would make it possible, among other things, to streamline the operation of the entire structure, to reduce the number of employees, and to bring the army under civilian control.

The restructuring of the RP armed forces should begin, in the first place, with the disbanding of completely unnecessary security units and the bolstering of those which remain from the old Warsaw Pact structure. The financial reserves freed up in this way may be used for the gradual development of territorial armies and for bringing in a corps-brigade organizational structure for the land line armies. This outline constitutes the core of the conceptual draft for restructuring which has been developed in our office.

The current national defense ministry budget, while very meager, makes possible this sort of restructuring, if it is fully implemented without any further cuts of the sort we had during the first quarter.

The army is aware of the enormous budgetary problems and it will do everything possible to make rational use of the funds received. A budget question is not a necessary condition for initiating organizational reform of the military.

3. The defense doctrine should be, above all, a document that outlines the right of state of the RP as the complex of supreme goals and interests of state which emanate from the order to preserve and strengthen its autonomous and sovereign existence. Thus, the doctrine should discern and define the present and potential dangers to the state, confront them with the methods and possibilities for countering these dangers, and, based upon this, define the general directions of state activity in the domestic and foreign fields, which directions will serve to strengthen the autonomous and sovereign existence of the nation. The doctrine should also define the long-term strategic goals of the operation of the state. The time frame defined by the Polish defense doctrine should be restricted to the period of transformation—the passage

from real socialism to democracy based on a market economy—which period is characterized by a rapid growth rate and a broad scope of change. After this period, the doctrine will have to be modified in order to adapt it to a stabilized (I hope) economic and political situation in our country.

The above-mentioned circumstances dictate that this document must be very general in nature. It should serve as the point of departure for diagnosing the events and tendencies which arise, both in Poland and in our external surroundings, and for finding appropriate and effective actions and practical solutions. The doctrine should outline the direction of not only our political and economic orientation but also of our civilizational orientation. In Poland's case, this is the direction leading to integration with the communities of the Western world.

The defense doctrine should also present the general plan for the armed counteraction of military dangers, especially aggression from without, if political means of resolving quarrels and conflicts fail. In this area, the doctrine should be not only the fundamental document outlining the system of state defense, but also a sign of the nation's determination to defend its freedom.

Komorowski on Parys' Attack, Defense Structure

92EP0405A Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 16, 19 Apr 92 p 10

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Bronislaw Komorowski, former deputy minister of National Defense, by Ewa Szemplinska; place and date not given: "Parys' Misfire"]

[Text] [Szemplinska] Let us begin with the version from the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] circle, according to which you are a candidate for chief of the Defense Ministry who may receive the approval of Jan Olszewski and the coalitional parties. Jan Parys must know both about personal considerations and about the president's list in which his dismissal was demanded. True, in his speech Jan Parys does not name any names, but in the ranking published in NOWY SWIAT, you hold second place after Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

[Komorowski] That is painful to me, because it discredits my reliability as a politician, deputy, and member of the Sejm National Defense Commission [KON]. What is worse is that I was accused of participating in the collapse of the state. For this reason, at the KON meeting, I very quickly presented documented explanations of the circumstances of the speech of Minister Parys. On the other hand, the personal considerations of which you speak are impossible without an assessment of the opportunity for creating a coalition of 10 parties, and since it seems to me that these are small parties, I do not believe that Jan Parys felt threatened by speculations about me. I would also like to remind you that on 10 February 1992 I received my dismissal from the hands of the prime minister—true, with a smile and thanks for my good work, but without substantive justification.

[Szemplinska] Then let us consider the variant of the torpedoing of coalition talks.

[Komorowski] It seems to me to be considerably more likely that this was set up at a high level of government. And I am inclined to believe this because the announcement which I presented for publication in NOWY SWIAT was blocked by PAP [Polish Press Agency]. I do not believe "that this decision was made by the present head of the agency without an understanding with his boss."

[Szemplinska] People who know Zdzislaw Najder say that it is an "intrigue in his style," especially since he is not a spokesman for the coalition of 10.

[Komorowski] There is no answer to this question. On the other hand, Jan Parys' absence from the meeting of the Sejm KON led to an outcry from me and from the other deputies.

[Szemplinska] Jan Olszewski, when asked to intervene, said that the minister "is not at the prime minister's disposal." What does this mean?

[Komorowski] It is a formula which means nothing. Ministers are obliged to be at his disposal, and besides, there is a kind of elementary moral courage which demands coming before the commission and explaining what is going on, or submitting one's resignation.

[Szemplinska] There is yet another version. You are merely a scapegoat. What's really going on here is that there is a power struggle between the Belweder and the government.

[Komorowski] The fact is that the powers of the individual elements of state authority over the army are not properly regulated, and they will not be properly regulated before the constitutional debate which decides about the Polish system. This makes it all the more important, however, that we move cautiously in this sphere, aiming toward uncompromising and carefully weighed solutions.

[Szemplinska] Who really governs the army?

[Komorowski] Formally, the person responsible for the entire armed forces is the minister of national defense, to whom both the WP [Polish army] General Staff and the MON [Ministry of National Defense] institutions are subject. However, the army is led by the chief of the General Staff, while the defense policy is directed by the civilian minister. This is a normally accepted principle throughout the world.

[Szemplinska] But the president is the superior of the armed forces.

[Komorowski] His role is likewise not explained. When the president was Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, certain matters, in my opinion, purposely were not clarified, and since he was a military person and had authority in the army, formal regulations certainly seemed less essential.

[Szemplinska] Lech Walesa is a civilian elected in a general election and he believes that he has the right to control the army.

[Komorowski] He is right. His future powers will have to be defined precisely in the course of a calm discussion about the system. I merely wish to point out that if there were only one structure of state authority, it would be a dangerous placement of control, responsibility and decisionmaking with regard to the army. For example, the French have a National Security Bureau which is a joint and permanent council of the president and the prime minister, and only the importance of issues determines who has the deciding voice about them, is an interesting one. Adopting a similar model could help us to achieve a consensus and could make the president the real superior of the armed forces. I also believe that the powers of the president on the issue of the personnel makeup of the defense ministry should be upheld. His role should end here, however. The powers of the offices of the President's Chancellery must also be clearly defined.

[Szemplinska] Does the military see the prospect of security and stabilization in either of these structures—the government/parliamentary or the presidential?

[Komorowski] Primarily in the presidential system, since this is a longer term prospect. But please remember that this structure does not guarantee immediate stability either. Jacek Merkel was responsible for the armed forces, then Lech Kaczynski, and now Jerzy Milewski, and informally people are talking about Mieczyslaw Wachowski. Moreover, the government/parliamentary structure will determine the shape and operation of the army, for this reduces itself in large part to finances and the structure of the army.

[Szemplinska] What threatens the current situation? A coup d'etat of lieutenants?

[Komorowski] I do not think so. The memory of martial law is too fresh and the weariness of continually expecting changes which do not take place is too great. No politician who proposes such a concept has met with approval.

[Szemplinska] But the military cannot be happy with this state of unrest and with the attempt to draw it into political games.

[Komorowski] No, it is not happy with this. The army approved the depoliticization of the military, seeing in this an opportunity to isolate itself from political conflicts, and now it observes a "battle to govern souls" and is expressing its displeasure. It is not yet the "rumble of the army," but it must be reckoned with, although the distance is long from rumbling to a coup.

[Szemplinska] As deputy minister of defense, did you come into contact with any sort of covert structures operating in the Polish army?

[Komorowski] With one, which, from the viewpoint of military law, is illegal. The organization Viritim, however, is at least tolerated by the present leadership of the ministry.

Background on Polish-German Arms Dealings

Figures Involved Discussed

92EP0364A Warsaw EXPRESS WIECZORNY
in Polish 30 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by (JP): "Secrets of the Legia Tennis Court: The Boys From Arms Square"]

[Text] The Legia-Olimpia spring match was not attended by anyone from Wojtysiak Holding Company. But not so long ago they used to be eager visitors. They used to fill completely the VIP section, so that ushers had to hastily add chairs because there was not enough room for all the benefactors. During the intermissions high-sounding praise was showered on Warsaw's soccer team. The Warsfutbol [Warsaw Soccer] Foundation was established. A stadium, such as would be in vain to find in this part of the then-still-divided Europe, was to arise. Nowadays six of that group of "businessmen" are occupying cells in two German jails. They were suspected and detained in connection with an attempt to illegally sell weapons to Iraq.

Sports are a good cover for shady deals, and these gentlemen were not the first to discover this.

The tennis matches were a pretext for meetings and agreements on deal priorities. The initiates claim that all this began even before Warsfutbol, during a Poland-Zimbabwe match on the Central Tennis Court of Legia [Central Military Sports Club]. During intermissions between the games and sets the gentlemen seated in the VIP section discoursed on the subject that even one cent of profit from a single projectile is the best business deal under the sun. As to the identities of those who sat there, those whom they met socially, and the subject of their conversations on both sides of the tennis net, this is no longer a task for reporters alone: The answers are to be found by the special services, and it will take some time before we know the names of all the protagonists, all the boys from "Arms Square."

EXPRESS WIECZORNY was one of the first newspapers to peek behind the curtain of Warsfutbol. We have already reported on suspicious deals, currency transfers, and violations of law. No one has asked us for a rectification, no one has threatened to sue us for libel. Now we know why. The beloved "benefactors" simply did not have the time for it, because they were busy with something much more important. They did not confine themselves to importing bathroom tiles as part of payment for the best soccer player of that club, Dariusz Dziekanowski. The threads led in many directions but was the ball of yarn in the court of Wojtysiak Holding Company? It was the employees of that company who

were detained in Germany. The company's head claimed a political provocation. Let us wait until the ball of yarn is rolled up.

A year ago someone from Thaipol Company gave a reporter his business card and claimed that the suspect soccer deals were just a minor aspect of the affair. He claimed to be knowledgeable about contacts. There was no second meeting, because soon afterward the car in which he rode on a German highway struck a TIR truck while traveling at a speed of 200 km per hour. Not everyone in the car died. Was it merely fortuitous? The secret was taken to the grave. Perhaps it was one of the secrets of Legia's Central Tennis Court?

Although it all probably began on Legia's tennis courts, other places in the nation's capital also are linked to the activities of the persons arrested in Frankfurt. Jerzy Brzostek used to be until June 1991 the director general of the construction of the Warsaw Metro. At the same time he belonged to the management of Wojtysiak Holding Company.

These gentlemen made sure that the substantial funds then poured into that priority project would not be distributed to just any contractor: Most of the operations connected with building the Warsaw Metro were assigned to Wojtysiak's companies. One member of the former management of Metro construction said that the highest invoices were submitted by these companies and the payments were, clearly, received at the right address. Brzostek too did not lose thereby. After all, in addition to directing the construction of the Metro, he was the chairman of Warsfutbol. That foundation was supposed to assist young soccer players from Warsaw, but actually the nature of its activities was not unequivocal. Warsaw residents and natives know, e.g., of the huge beer wholesale warehouses at Bem Forts, not far from the Powazki Cemetery.

The initiates say, "As soon as the Metro received an injection of funds from the municipal budget, things began to stir at Warsfutbol."

The principal person in Legia was for a long time the third among those arrested, General Wojciech Baranski. For four years he was the chairman. To be sure, he played tennis less frequently than Brzostek, but he liked to sit in the VIP section during major international matches.

Baranski used to be a major personage in [the communist] People's Polish Army. He often frequented the VIP section of the Central Tennis Court. He had unusually extensive contacts, especially in the former USSR. He had visited Croatia and African countries. In [postcommunist] Poland he remained unscathed. What is more even, during the Mazowiecki administration he was allowed to act as the ambassador to Cuba until as late as 1991.

The Metro has ceased to matter most. The state budget stopped funding this project to on the same scale as

previously. Legia too became impoverished, after its subsidy was also cut off. The stadium site is decaying and the swimming pool is in ruins. Thus, with the funding sources plugged, only Legia's Central Tennis Court has remained in operation. Until recently Jerzy Brzostek played tennis on that court, along with other prominent members of the old and new administrations. Now and then a newcomer would appear. After the racquets were put down, risky deals were discussed.

Legia's employees are upset by the rumors that soon now the tennis court will become the property of Batax Company. They are aware that the management of that company likes movies and theater, as for tennis that is something else. At least that is how it looks to them. They simply are not conversant with all the secrets. EXPRESS WIECZORNY will try to be of assistance not only in exploring the warehouses in Bem Forty. After all such warehouses may also be storing ammunition.

The office of the German prosecutor has initiated an investigation of the seven Poles detained on 10 April in Frankfurt-on-Main on the suspicion of illegal arms dealings. The authorities claim that they violated the law on exports of military hardware (any such transaction requires approval by the German federal agencies). The detainees object and claim that they did not conclude any contract; they have appealed to a court (at present their appeal is being considered by the investigating magistrate, who will decide whether to continue their detention or to release them on their own cognizance).

Let us add that the German law enforcement agencies refuse to disclose any information on this subject, and that the entire affair was given relatively little publicity on the Rhine, so that all are awaiting the finale of the proceedings.

At the same time, however, the United States set in motion—according to REUTERS, which referred to THE LOS ANGELES TIMES—proceedings for the extradition of six Poles kept in German prisons in order to indict them before an American court for violating the law on arms exports. Their names, as listed, are: Jerzy Napiorkowski, Wojciech Baranski, Jan Gorecki, Zbigniew Grabowski, Jerzy Brzostek, and Rajmund Szwonder. (The seventh person to be arrested in Frankfurt, Stan Kinman, initially reported to be a Pole, is said to be a United States citizen.)

Ronald Hendron, an American businessman who was detained on 11 April in New York as the main organizer of the attempted sale of arms from Poland to Iraq (subsequently released on bail), declared in an interview granted to THE LOS ANGELES TIMES that he had committed no crime, because he has a permit for arms dealing and he intended to legally dispatch military equipment from Poland to the Philippines and not to Iraq. He also contended, "The secret agents demanded of the Eastern bloc officials that they provide nuclear arms (including bombs), whereas we (i.e., Hendron's group) did not at all intend anything like that."

[In the United States] this report was mentioned solely in THE WASHINGTON POST and on several TV news-casts.

Photo Captions

1. p. 1: Jerzy Brzostek used to be, among other things, a deputy minister of construction and the vice mayor of Warsaw, and between 1982 and June 1991 he was the director general of the construction of the Warsaw Metro.
2. p. 1: Jerzy Napiorkowski used to be, among other things, deputy minister of finance from December 1986 until September 1990. For many years he had headed the Treasury Office in Warsaw.
3. p. 1: Wojciech Baranski, general of arms (ret.), used to be, among other things, deputy chief of the general staff of the Polish Army and, between 1984 and 1989, chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training, Polish Army.

Radom Factory Profiled

92EP0364B KULISY EXPRESS WIECZORNY
in Polish 3, 4, 5 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Czeslaw Curylo: "Lucznik Small Arms Plant Is Stung: Who Is the Culprit?"]

[Text] Anna Szwonder is not in Radom, and at her workplace she had requested that her current address not be divulged. She gave assurances, however, that she is not in hiding, it is just that she has been so unlucky in life: She could but did not depart for a training course for social workers.

She was on the verge of a nervous breakdown when she confided, "I just could not live if my husband were to be taken away to the United States and placed in jail there."

She had never before read GAZETA WYBORCZA, but now she practically begins her day with a visit to the newsstand and fearfully listens to the radio. Her mouth trembling, restraining her tears, she claimed, "GAZETA's reporters made of my husband a gangster, but that gangster earns 3,400,000 zlotys [Z] monthly and lives together with his family in an M-3 [shoddy apartment]."

They had first met in Szczecin, "Because I am a Szczecinier," she explains. Rajmund Szwonder attended the department of mechanics at that city's polytechnic, while she majored in rehabilitation. After living in Pomerania for several years they decided in February 1976 to move to Radom. Her husband comes from Laskarzew, a small settlement near Radom, and has a sister living in Radom. Immediately after moving he began to work at Lucznik.

Engineer Szwonder climbed, one after another, career rungs at that plant, without being pushy. Barely two years ago, after the plant management was replaced, he became deputy director for manufacturing. In the last

few months he had painfully experienced the problems plaguing the plant. He traveled to Warsaw in search of a rescue for the plant.

Anna Szwonder narrated, "I am so nervous that I cannot remember it exactly, but it must have happened early in March. My husband traveled to Germany as a member of an official delegation. He was to return on Woman's Day, and we even joked about the present he was going to bring me. He did not come back, and since he is a man of his word, I thought that he met with an accident. I called my husband's office and they told me not to worry, because the negotiations in Germany were being prolonged. I was notified that he was certain to return on 10 March. But he did not return."

"What happened next?"

"Then I became very upset, especially because this time Lucznik's Director for Engineering Bronislaw Killan telephoned and asked if I had any news from my husband, because they are surprised at his not having returned although two days earlier he had called to say that he was certain to get back after completing the negotiations."

Her job paid her Z2 million monthly. She spent her days on providing vocational rehabilitation for her clients and then returned to an empty home. And afterward, the worst moment came when she read that her husband was arrested in Frankfurt on suspicion of smuggling arms and could be extradited to the United States. "After all, I and my son could not even travel there to visit him," she declared achingly.

She does not believe that her husband is involved in some criminal affair. This is so unlike him. When the newspapers first reported on her husband's arrest, she received from people at Lucznik a steady stream of calls of sympathy and offers of help, a stream which continues to this very day. "And this is most important to me."

"Could you please describe what kind of man your husband is?"

"He is the kind of man to whom work alone counts, not the home or the family. All these years he had never been late to work."

To this day Anna Szwonder has not been notified by Germans or Americans about her husband's arrest.

Director Szwonder is the legal representative of a Polish arms plant. From official sources it is known that, in detaining the Poles, the agents of the special services followed the principle that any trick is permitted so long as the CIA's aim is achieved.

The Plant's CEO Confirms

Engineer Waldemar Szajewski, the general director of the Radom Lucznik and Szwondek's immediate superior, said:

"Director Szwonder traveled as a member of an official delegation pursuant to an understanding with me. While in Germany he was to engage in technical talks concerning our production. That is all I can say for now, and please understand that I do not know anything other than what I can glean from Press reports on what has happened."

"Did the German or American public prosecutor's office notify you about the detention of your deputy?"

"No, although several weeks have passed since then. I do not believe that Director Szwonder was involved in any illegal activities; I know him too well, but it also is not my custom to leap to a judgment prematurely, unlike some newspapers."

"Is Lucznik permitted to engage in arms dealings on its own?"

"Yes, we have the approval of our government, but I wish to emphasize that Lucznik Metal Works not only had not signed any contract last March but also has not established any contacts concerning exports of noncatalog products."

"What does it mean, 'non-catalog'?"

"Weapons: rifles and pistols. One more important issue: In the last one and a half years Lucznik company has not been exporting arms to any country placed on the UN's embargo list, or on the additional list of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. This means that we did not sell arms to Iraq."

We Make Goods for Sale

On Monday 30 March Lucznik's directors and the board members of the plant's Solidarity attended a meeting in Warsaw at the Ministry of Industry to discuss a program for restructuring the enterprise. It was resolved to establish at once a special taskforce. Still, changes cannot be introduced overnight, and they will cost money, but everybody knows about the plant's dicey financial situation.

That is why hardly anybody at Lucznik does not feel sympathy for Deputy Director Szwonder and his arrest in Frankfurt-on-Main. The consensus of the workforce is that he had traveled there in order to keep the plant alive. The workforce is preparing a collective protest to express its solidarity with the detainee. This mood of determination is sensed already at the plant's office for admission of visitors, where, on seeing the visitor's press card, the person on duty volunteered the observation, "Director Szwonder is an exceptionally honest man." Others, workers, too, at the plant say likewise, and there is a general mood of outrage at the manner in which the affair was reported by GAZETA WYBORCZA. "We never said that we are manufacturing Kalashnikov rifles for old age homes. Don't the Americans themselves deal in arms?" they asked.

The personnel director, who did not want to be named, has the highest regard for Director Szwonder. "He did everything to save the plant. That also is the opinion of the entire workforce. After what happened things have come to such a pass that I drafted, as instructed by Director Szajewski, a letter to the trade union requesting its consent to lay off 1,860 employees in the next few weeks, but that may not be the end of it."

A worker who happened to pass by added, "Had Deputy Director Szwonder gotten the contract signed, our livelihood would have been assured for at least the next 10 months."

Without Complexes

Engineer Killan, the director for engineering, said:

"We have no complexes. We manufacture the Makarow, Symbol P-83 pistol, an excellent weapon, no worse than a Vis. We also make the P-84, a machine pistol for Parabellum bullets, colloquially known as the Kalashnikov. It is not inferior to its American and German counterparts. Deputy Director Szwonder left for Germany precisely in order to negotiate the sale of these pistols. We also are manufacturing a gun similar to the Israeli Uzi, for commandos, etc."

Following the Frankfurt arrest, the director made available information on prewar dealings in arms. They used to be handled by Sepewe Company in 1938. In that year Poland's arms sales totaled 70,717,000 [prewar] zlotys, and the Radom plant was involved. Nearly 10 percent of Polish military spending derived from arms sales.

Director Killan said, "Arms sales are one of the most profitable businesses. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Americans no longer have a major adversary. Demand for arms plummeted, and everyone is forced to look for markets abroad. In this business there is a ruthless competition for customers. Thus, Lucznik was hit."

The Matter Is Investigated

Minister Adam Glapinski appointed a commission for investigating the affair. As of the present he has no reasons to believe that any one of the Poles detained committed a crime.

Jan Strauss, director of the Central Board of Engineering, in charge of overseeing arms sales (in this post since less than a month), said:

"Lucznik was granted as far back as last fall a permit for independent sales of its products, and this is consonant with the spirit of reform. This Radom plant was, unlike the Bumar plant, unable to be represented independently and so had to rely on middlemen like the ATS company. That was its mistake, but then consider that autonomy is still new to it."

The question of the authenticity of the Philippine Government certification which was submitted to the Central Board of Engineering by James Herndon during his visit to Warsaw, remains unexplained. The Philippine Embassy at present displays considerable restraint in this matter, and this is not surprising. Until we know the full truth, the possibility that the certificate might be forged cannot be precluded; it may even have been prepared by the CIA, without Deputy Director Szwonder's knowing about it. That would make him innocent.

Deputy Director Killan said:

"Soon now this entire affair will be cleared up. And then a real scandal will break out and we shall demand every compensation, because the persons behind this affair must be held accountable."

Last Tuesday a foreign customer, whose visit had been scheduled long in advance, was expected at Lucznik. He never arrived. And on Wednesday the management sat down at a table with the trade unions to discuss layoffs.

American Investor Complaints Aired

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in Polish No 43, 9 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by (A.Sz.): "Ambiguous Signals for Foreign Investors: The Polish-American Chamber of Commerce Visits the Sejm"]

[Text] The amount of economic cooperation between Poland and the United States, is far from the expected levels, was the principal cause of a meeting of representatives of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce with four Sejm economic commissions (Agriculture and Food Industry, Economic System and Industry, Foreign Economic Cooperation, and Trade and Services).

The Polish-American Chamber of Commerce includes representatives of Polish and American business who together with the economic self-government bodies in both countries are attempting to form a lobby to promote the development of cooperation between Poland and the United States.

Andrzej Arendarski, president of the National Chamber of Commerce, who chaired the deliberations, emphasized the significance of cooperation with the United States and also drew attention to the joint problems that concern all foreign investors, especially the lack of favorable legal measures and a climate favoring the inflow of capital to Poland.

Robert W. Brimberry, who heads the American section of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, expressed concern at the ambiguous signals greeting investors in Poland in the name of business people from his country. They are apparent, among other ways, in the contradictory reactions of various Polish administrative bodies and the overly slow changes in economic policy. R.W. Brimberry cited a long list of limitations which block American investment. Among them are a prohibition on opening convertible-currency accounts by partnerships with foreign capital and the generally poor condition of the banking system in Poland.

He also drew attention to the faulty tax system, to the application of the "tax on excessive wage increases" to firms with foreign capital. He also called for the exclusion of foreign persons from the 43-percent tax for social insurance. The chairman of the American section also told those gathered that our neighbors from East Europe, especially CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], are competing for investment resources.

Deputy Andrzej Czernecki, chairman of the Polish section of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, called for the formation in Poland of a special office, an ombudsman for foreign investment, who would have the power to intervene in cases when economic initiatives are blocked.

Maciej Raczkiewicz, representing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Poland, noted the lack of cooperation by the Polish Government with business, which appears, among other ways, in the inability to gain loan guarantees. Deputy Ryszard Smolarek proposed forming a system of incentives for locating American investment in the areas of agriculture and the food industry, which can bring more rapid effects than in industry.

During the discussion, proposals were also made to form a special Sejm subcommittee to remove legal barriers blocking foreign capital. Stefan Lewandowski, president of the Chamber of Foreign Investors, said that proposals to remove many of the limitations were made a dozen or so years ago.

The discussion begun in the Sejm building will be continued at the 11th Plenary Session of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce at the beginning of May 1992. Joan Edwards, counselor for trade of the American Embassy, and Paul Wackerbarth, counselor for economics of the American Embassy, also participated in the meeting; Thaddeus Kopinski, director of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Washington, also came to Warsaw. On the other hand, none of the Polish ministers of the economic ministries who were invited to the Sejm meeting came.

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